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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant changes in the practice of corporate law
during the last half of the 1900s has been the proliferation and increasing
importance of law departments within corporations,' which employ about
Law clerk for the Honorable Ewing Werlein, Jr., U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Texas; B.B.A. 1992, Financial Management, University of North Dakota; 1998 J.D., University of
Pittsburgh School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Pat K. Chew for her comments on earlier
drafts of this article.
I
See Mary C. Daly, Ethical Challengesfor Law Departments in the Twenty-First Century, in
CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO LAWYERING LAWS 1.301, 1.301 (Business Laws, Inc. ed., 1996).
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ten to fifteen percent of all attorneys. 2 This transformation from outside
law firms to in-house legal departments has occurred because corporations
recognize the need for immediate advice from an attorney who is intimately
familiar with the corporation's business affairs3 and because of the
increased cost savings associated with paying in-house attorneys a fixed
salary instead of paying an hourly rate to outside counsel.4 Consequently,
5
corporations have been assigning larger roles to their legal departments.
Besides the growing perception that in-house counsel have the same power,
prestige, 6 and responsibilities as outside attorneys, in-house counsel are
also confronted with greater potential liabilities. Unfortunately, many inhouse counsel are unaware of the extent to which they can be held liable
for their actions -a void which this article attempts to fill.
Since the perceived loyalties are different, distinguishing between inhouse and outside counsel is important. Both in-house and outside
attorneys strive to accomplish the same primary goal: to work for the best
interests of the corporation. 8 The difference between the two types of
attorneys lies in how they accomplish that goal. Outside counsel have
numerous clients and negotiate a fee with the corporation instead of receiving a salary since they are not employees. 9 In contrast, in-house counsel
Furthermore, a 1995 Price Waterhouse Law Department Spending Survey suggests that the trend will
continue. See Carol McHugh Sanders, O'Brien Puts Himself Back in the Game, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Apr. 1, 1996, at 3 (discussing the survey results, which found that 43% of corporations had added more
attorneys to their law departments, and 37% intended to increase the number of attorneys in the future).
2
See Frederick,Cutting Lawyers May Not Be the Best Way to Cut Costs, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 17,
1994, at C6; see also 3 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24.7, at 192
(4th ed. 1996) (noting that the number of in-house attorneys has doubled over the last ten years).
3
See Harry S. Hardin & Andrew R. Lee, Pitfallsfor In-House Counsel, BRIEF, Winter 1996,
at 33.
4
See, e.g., Domenick C. DiCicco, Jr., To Increase Productivity Rebuild In-House Counsel,
BEST'S REVJPROP.-CAS. INS. EDITION, Aug. 1, 1996, at 90; David Pendered, Grady's Lawyer Costs
Rising Outside the Curve: While Many Hospitals are Trimming Legal Fees by Hiring More In-House
Attorneys, Grady Increasingly Retains PrestigiousLaw Firms, ATLANTA J., Aug. 23, 1997, at E6
(noting the $500,000 savings that can be achieved by hiring more in-house attorneys).
5
See Eugene R. Anderson & Joshua Gold, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 15, 1996, at C27; Margaret
Cronin Fisk, In-House Lawyers Increasingly Seek Liability Coverage, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 14, 1992, at
23.
6
See Saundra Torry, Attorneys Who Come In-House from the Cold, WASH. POST, July 10,
1995, at F7 (discussing the increased prestige attributed to in-house counsel positions).
7
See Stephen M. Honig, Some PracticalPerspectives on Liability of In-House Counsel, in
CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO LAWYERING LAWS 8.201, 8.201 (Business Laws, Inc. ed., 1996).
8
See Robert M. Craig 1I, Dual Role of In-House Counsel (Attorney and Client) ... and Other
Aspects of a "Split Personality" Profession, in CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO LAWYERING LAWS
1.201, 1.202 (Business Laws, Inc. ed., 1996).
9
See Thomas H. Watkins & Paula Bird, Conflicts: The Rules and the Reality as They Apply
to Business and Industry Situations, in CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO LAWYERING LAWS 2.001,
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work for only one client (the corporation), are an employee of that client,
and receive a salary from that client.' 0 Furthermore, in-house attorneys
become involved in many more dual roles than outside counsel, including
being both an attorney and a client, a businessperson and legal counsel, and
an investigator and compliance officer." This article generally focuses on
the enhanced liabilities faced by in-house counsel in particular. In some
instances, there are few reported cases or ethics opinions pertaining directly
to in-house attorneys; thus, this article sometimes uses examples of the
liabilities experienced by outside counsel to illustrate the types of liabilities
which in-house counsel also can experience.
Although the duties owed to the corporate client by both in-house and
outside counsel are similar, in-house counsel face some particularly
different tensions and conflicts which outside counsel do not experience.17
In-house attorneys provide a valuable service by being regularly available3
and easily accessible to provide legal advice for problems that arise daily.'
However, this precise "coziness" with management often causes in-house
counsel to face significant liabilities. This enhanced risk of liability results
primarily from in-house counsel's greater knowledge of the corporation's
business operations than outside counsel. Consequently, in-house attorneys
are held to a higher level of responsibility for their advice
and work
4
years.
the
over
complex
more
become
have
product, which
Thus, it is essential that all corporate counsel-but, particularly inhouse counsel-become aware of the potential liabilities which they could
face, and how they can minimize or avoid those liabilities. This article
continues with a discussion in Part II about who is the client and to whom
counsel owes their loyalty when representing corporate constituents or
when serving on the corporation's board of directors. Part II then
discusses some major areas of the law under which corporate counsel can
be held liable: fiduciary laws, ERISA, securities laws, aiding and abetting,
2.004 (Business Laws, Inc. ed., 1996).
to
See id.; see also General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 491 (Cal. 1984)
(describing how in-house counsel, because they only have one client, are disadvantaged more than
outside counsel if they are unable to recover under an implied-in-fact contract claim); Todd Myers, The
In-House Attorney Employment Dilemma, 6 KAN. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 147, 147 (1997) (providing an

example of the dilemma which in-house counsel faces because the corporation is the sole client).
In
12
13
14

See Craig, supra note 8, at 1.202.
See Hardin & Lee, supra note 3, at-40.

See id. at 33.
See Elise Staffenberg, Note, Treacherous Terrain for In-House Bank Attorneys, 14 ANN.
REV. BANKING L 405, 410 (1995). For example, during the savings and loan crisis of the early 1990s,

the Office of Thrift Supervision placed some of the blame for the collapse of the savings and loan
industry on in-house banking lawyers. See W. John Moore, Clubbing Counsel, NAT'L J., July 25, 1992,
at 1714.
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environmental laws, intellectual property laws, antitrust laws, commercial
transactions, and providing improper advice or unsound legal opinions.
Finally, Part IV offers some practical advice about how corporate counsel
can minimize their liability exposure or avoid it altogether.
II. WHO IS THE CLIENT?

The age-old question for corporate counsel is to whom do they owe
their duty of loyalty? In theory, this question has a simple answer, but in
practice, many difficult issues arise.' The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules") provide the theoretical answer: the attorney's
client is the corporation. 6 However, in practice, "[t]he corporate lawyer
who resorts to [the Model Rules] for assistance usually finds nothing more
than silence or vague generalities that are of little help in solving practical,
immediate concerns.' t This is particularly true when the in-house attorney
also represents a corporate employee or serves on the board of directors of
the corporation for which he or she is employed.
A. Basic Rules
The Model Rules clearly state that the "organization" is the client.1
When representing the corporation, counsel must ensure that they act in the
best interests of only the corporation. Even if the Model Rules are not
considered vague, applying them is still often difficult for in-house counsel
because the Rules treat in-house counsel the same as attorneys in private
practice.' 9 The problem lies with the environments in which in-house and
IS

For example, in the context of a takeover, the "entity theory of representation ... is an

unrealistic approach to corporate representation." Miriam P. Hechler, The Role of the Corporate
Attorney Within the Takeover Context: Loyalties to Whom?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 943, 943 (1996).
This results from counsel's duty to determine what is in the entity's best interests, id. at 943, which
allows counsel to look at the best interests of the corporation's constituents. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. (1983) [hereinafter, Model Rules]. However, the interests of
the constituents are often adverse to each other, Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962)
(recognizing the conflict between management and shareholders), thereby making it practically
impossible to consider the interests of the amorphous "entity" itself.
16
See Model Rule 1.13.
17
Frederick W. Kanner, Overview of Professional Responsibility Issues for the Corporate
Lawyer, in CONFLICrS OF INTEREST IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 211, 221 (Robert J.Jossen, chair,
Practicing Law Institute, 1988); see also Staffenberg, supra note 14, at 412 (discussing how the Model
Rules provides very vague guidance about who the client is and the types of liabilities which in-house
counsel can face).
18

See Model Rule 1.13(a); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18

(1981) [hereinafter, Model Code] ("A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity
owes his allegiance to the entity ...").
19
See Staffenberg, supranote 14, at 412.
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outside counsel work. For example, an in-house attorney-as an employee
of the corporation-must follow the orders given by superiors or risk
facing termination. Simultaneously, the in-house attorney must also
comply with the professional responsibility rules which may not allow him
or her to follow the orders given by superiors. 20 Thus, in-house counsel
could be presented with a dilemma between incurring professional liability
versus being fired from their only client. Although outside counsel may
face the same dilemma, the consequence is not as severe since they have
other clients.
In the situation previously described, the Model Rules require that
counsel take some sort of action when he or she knows that an agent of the
corporation is about to breach or has breached an obligation owed to the
corporation or is about to violate the law or has already violated the law.2 '
The attorney has several
22 options: (1) ask the agent to reconsider23the
matter,22 (2) advise that an independent legal opinion be obtained, (3)
refer the matter to a higher authority in the corporation,2 or (4) if none of
the previous actions are successful, counsel can resign.2 5
B. Representing Constituents & Third-PartyLiability
Although the organizational entity is technically the counsel's client, 26
the entity is a 27legal fiction that can not function independently without
,,28
representatives. Thus, the entity acts through "authorized constituents.
These constituents include the corporation's directors, officers, employees,
and shareholders, 29 all of whom counsel is allowed to represent, 3 unless
.

20
See Model Rule 1.2(d) (prohibiting an attorney from counseling or assisting a client in
committing a criminal or fraudulent act).
21
See Model Rule 1.13(b).
22
See Model Rule 1.13(b)(l). The only option available to counsel under the Model Code is to
request that the offender rectify the fraud committed upon the corporation. See Model Code DR 7102(B)(1).
23
See Model Rule 1.13(b)(2).
24
See Model Rule 1.13(b)(3). Under the Model Code, whether the attorney can reveal a
corporate representative's fraud to a higher authority is unclear. See George D. Reycraft, Conflicts of
Interest and Effective Representation: The Dilemma of CorporateCounsel, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 611
(1988); see also N.Y. City Bar, Formal Op. 2 (1986) (finding that disclosure does not violate the
attorney's duty to keep information confidential since the corporation, not the corporate representative,
is the attorney's client).

See Model Rule 1.13(c). However, the lawyer must be certain that there is a clear violation
of the law which is likely to result in substantial injury to the corporation. See id.
25

See Model Rule 1.13(a); Model Code EC 5-18.
See Model Rule 1.13 cmt.; see also Martin Lowy, A Bank General Counsel: Defining a
Role as Lawyer to Boardof Directors?,BANKING POL'Y REP., June 3, 1996, at 14.
2
Model Rule 1.13(b).
29
See Model Rule 1.13 cmt.
26

27
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such representation would create a conflict of interest.3 Although alleged
conflicts often arise when there is dual representation of both the
corporation and its directors, employees, or shareholders,32 such
representation is allowed under Model Rule 1.7 if (1) the interests of the
constituent and the corporation are not adverse to each other, and (2) both
clients consent to dual representation.33
Model Rule 1.7 also contains the premise that counsel can and should
investigate new, potential clients (i.e., the directors, employees, or shareholders) to see if representation of them would be adverse to representing
the existing client (i.e., the corporation). 34 In the usual in-house setting,
however, counsel is not looking to add new clients since he or she already
has one particular client-the corporation. Instead, the usual scenario is
that one of the corporation's constituents to whom counsel may owe a perceived dut% of loyalty "through the derivative relationship with the corporate client" 5 suddenly appears with a legitimate problem. Alternatively, an
attorney-client relationship may be created without the intentional
knowledge of counsel, 36 especially "given the frequent ambiguity of the
relationship between an entity's lawyer and its individual constituents. 3 7
30
31

See Model Rule 1.13(e); Model Code EC 5-18.
See Model Rule 1.13(e); Model Code EC 5-18. If there is a conflict of interest, then counsel
must explain to the non-entity party the identity of the client (i.e., the corporation). See Model Rule
1.13(d). However, dual representation is still allowed if consent is provided by either the shareholders
or "an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented."
Model Rule 1.13(e).
32
Accord H. Ward Classen, Lawyers Share Views on Ethical Concernsfor In-House Counsel,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at S16.
33
See Model Rule 1.7. The Code is even more forceful in disallowing multiple representation.
See Model Code DR 5-105.
3
See Model Rule 1.7; Thomas B. Metzloff, Ethical Considerationsfor the Corporate Legal
Counsel, C566 A.L.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 109, 115 (1990).
35
Id. at 115.
36
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996). which states:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
(1) A person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide legal
services for the person; and either
(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or
reasonablyshould know that the person reasonablyrelies on the lawyer to provide
the services;or
(2) a tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to provide the services.
Id. (emphasis added).
37
Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to "Non-Clients": Reconceptualizing the
Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45
S.C. L REV. 659, 673 (1994).
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Historically, third parties could not sue attorneys for alleged harm since
there was no privity.38 Recently, some states have passed statutes or there
have been court decisions which allow third parties to sue professionals
without having any privity of contract. 39 Consequently, the number of third
parties suing attorneys for alleged malpractice has been increasing, 40 with
about one-fourth of all claims against attorneys being by someone other
than the attorney's client.4' Although in-house counsel have only one
client-the corporation-they actually have a greater potential of incurring
liability from third parties since the corporation is not the only one who
relies on the advice of counsel. 42 Although still a minority view, the
increasing number of cases which find third-party liability generally do so
under one of three alternatives: (1) the corBoration's purpose in retaining
counsel was to benefit a third party directly, (2) it was foreseeable that the
third party would rely on the attorney's advice, 44 and/or (3) the third party
45
Some courts use
was a foreseeable beneficiary of the attorney's advice.
46
an approach which balances several of these factors.
38

See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 7.1, at 490; see, e.g., Gaar v. North Myrtle Beach

Realty Co., 339 S.E.2d 887, 889 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the attorney's liability is only to his
client and not to third persons whose claims arise from representation of the client).
39
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1998). But see, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.1 l(4)(a)
(West 1998) (requiring privity for a malpractice action in either tort or contract); Green Springs Farms
v. Kersten, 401 N.W.2d 816, 826 (Wis. 1987) (stating that a third-party cannot sue an attorney since the
state has not recognized a cause of action when no privity exists). It should be noted, however, that
counsel will not be liable for one constituent's breach of fiduciary duty against another constituent.
Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 155 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 8,

1997).
40

See Laura Callaway Hart et al., From Offense to Defense: Defending Legal Malpractice

Claims, 45 S.C. L. REV. 771, 781 (1994).
41

See A.B.A.

STANDING

COMMITTEE ON LAW. PROF. UABILITY,

PROFILE OF LEGAL

MALPRACTICE 44-58 (1986).
42
See Brian E. Fliflet, Third Party Suits May Leave In-House CounselLiable, CORP. L. TIMES,
Oct. 1995, at 26.
43
See, e.g., Holmes v. Winners Entertainment, Inc., 531 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(finding that there was no "direct" benefit to the third party since corporate counsel's services flowed
through the corporation before benefitting the third party).
44
See, e.g., Atlantic Paradise Assoc., Inc. v. Perskie, Nehmad & Zeltner, 666 A.2d 211, 214
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (stating that an attorney can be liable to a nonclient for
This
misrepresentations in public offering statements since reliance on such is foreseeable).
foreseeability requirement ensures that counsel is not liable to someone with whom he or she does not
deal at arm's length. Otherwise, the attorney would be preoccupied with the possibility of incurring
liability from any unknown person with whom his or her client might deal. Accord Goodman v.
Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737, 743 (Cal. 1976); B.LM. v. Sabo & Deitsch, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 346 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997).
45
See Gerald J. Buchwald, In-House Target: Third Parties are Taking Aim at Corporate
Counsel, NAT'L U., Nov. 15, 1993, at SI. For example, in Felty v. Hartweg, a minority shareholder
sued the corporation's counsel, alleging that counsel breached his fiduciary duty by failing to warn him

8
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For example, in E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown,47 a corporation's outside
counsel met with a corporate officer the night before an SEC hearing and
accompanied the officer to the hearing. About four months later, counsel
also accompanied the officer to a bankruptcy hearing. In a disqualification
proceeding,48 counsel argued that he could not have been the officer's
personal attorney since he was required to be at the hearings to represent
the corporation, and the officer was there merely as a spokesperson for the
corporation. 49 However, the court found that the officer's belief that the
corporation's counsel also represented him personally was reasonable, 50
and therefore, an attorney-client relationship was created wherein counsel
was required to exercise independent professional judgment for both the
corporation and the officer.5 '
Fortunately for in-house counsel, the majority of courts have not
accepted this view. 52 For instance, in Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 53 a
of fraudulent financial dealings committed by several corporate officers and shareholders which caused
harm to the minority shareholder. However, the court held that the attorney was not liable to the
nonclient since there was no express agreement that the minority shareholder was intended to be a
beneficiary of the contract between the attorney and the corporation. 523 N.E.2d 555, 557 (111.
App. Ct.
1988). The court in Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, went even further and stated that even
if the attorney "could have foreseen the adverse consequences of his advice and its impact on [the
shareholder] is not sufficient justification for fixing liability on him to a nonclient shareholder." 282
Cal. Rptr. 627, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
46
See, e.g., Donahue v. Shughart, Thomason & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.w.2d 624, 629 (Mo.
1995). The recent court decision listed the factors as:
(1) the existence of a specific intent by the client that the purpose of the attorney's services were to benefit the plaintiffs.
(2) the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiffs as a result of the attorney's negligence.
(3) the degree of the certainty that the plaintiffs will suffer injury from attorney misconduct.
(4) the closeness of the connection between the attorney's conduct and the injury.
(5) the policy of preventing future harm.
(6) the burden on the profession of recognizing liability under the circumstances.
Id.
47
305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
48
Although this was not a case in which liability was being alleged against counsel, it
demonstrates how an attorney-client relationship can be created unknowingly, which could potentially
lead to liability if counsel fails to adequately represent his or her client.
49
See 305 F. Supp. at 388.
50
The court emphasized that "not all corporate counsel appearing with corporate officers who
are called to testify will risk disqualification." Id. at 398. Instead, the court put the onerous on counsel
to ensure that the officer did not misunderstand whom counsel was representing. See id.
51
See id. at 396; see also Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 515 (Wyo. 1995) (holding that an
issue of fact existed as to whether counsel for a close corporation also represented an officer of the
corporation).
52
See Moore, supra note 37, at 684; see also Hart, supra note 40, at 781.
53
545 F. Supp. 1124, 1125 (N.D. II1. 1982).
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50 percent shareholder/director sought to disqualify an attorney from
representing the corporation because he believed that the attorney also
represented him personally. 54 The court, however, found that the attorney's
work for the shareholder/director was primarily corporate related and that
those were the only matters for which advice was sought; therefore, the
shareholder-director could not have had a reasonable belief that the
attorney also represented him personally.55
Some courts have gone so far as to require an express contract before
finding that corporate counsel represents one of the corporation's
constituents. For example, in Torres v. Divis,56 an investor who subsequently took over a business sued the attorney who handled the
incorporation procedures. 57 The investor claimed that the attorney was
liable for malpractice because the attorney failed to inform him about
numerous debts that the business had previously incurred. 5 8 He claimed
that the attorney personally represented him and thus, filed a malpractice
suit for negligence.59 However, the court held that there was no attorneyclient relationship because such a relationship arises "only when both the
attorney and client have consented to its formation," which did not occur
here because there was no evidence that the attorney expressly agreed to
represent the investor. 60
1. DIRECTORS & OFFICERS
Corporate counsel oftentimes are asked to advise the directors and
officers of a corporation about the personal liability which they may incur
if they agree to enter into a particular transaction or take certain corporate
actions. Depending on the circumstances, a director or officer may believe
that the in-house attorney is providing the advice as his or her personal
attorney. Thus, they may sue the in-house attorney if they are later held
liable.
61
For example, in Waggoner v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaris & Krauss,
the CEO of a corporation hired counsel who initially reincorporated a
corporation in Delaware and drafted a shareholders' agreement three years

54

55

See id. at 1125.
See id. at 1126-28; see also infra Part Il.B.3 and accompanying text (discussing the creation

of an attorney-client relationship in close corporations).
56
494 N.E.2d 1227 (111.App. Ct. 1986).
57
See id. at 1229-31.
58
See id. at 1230.
59
See id. at 1230-31.
60
See id. at 1231.
61
991 F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1993).
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later to transfer voting control of the corporation to the CEO.62
Subsequently, when the corporation's board of directors learned that the
CEO had violated his fiduciary duties and removed him from office, the
CEO asked counsel whether his shareholder voting rights entitled him to
remove the rest of the board. 63 Counsel replied that the CEO had such
voting rights; however, a court found that the shareholder agreement was
improperly drafted. 64 Consequently, the CEO filed a malpractice action
against the attorney claiming that counsel represented him personally as an
officer of the corporation and that he relied on such representation. The
court, however, found that counsel did not personally represent the CEO
because he did not affirmatively assume
a duty toward the officer, despite
66
the officer's reliance on the advice.
A minority of courts have held counsel liable to a corporation's
directors. For instance, in Collins v. Fitzwater,67 counsel was retained to
68
draft promissory notes according to a board-approved financing plan.
After the corporation became insolvent, purchasers of the notes sued the
corporation and its directors, alleging that the corporation's attorney
improperly drafted the notes because the notes were securities that had
been sold without being registered. 69 Consequently, the directors were held
jointly and severally liable to the purchasers for damages, and the directors
sued the corporate counsel for malpractice. 70 The court held that the
attorney was liable because he negligently failed to advise the directors that
they might incur personal liability if unregistered securities were sold.7'

62
63

See id. at 1503.
See id. at 1504.

64

See id.
See id. at 1504-05.
66
See id. at 1508; see also Robertson v. Baston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 536 N.E.2d 344, 348
(Mass. 1989) (holding that, even if an attorney-client relationship was created between a corporate
officer and the law firm representing the corporation, there would be no liability since the officer did
not reasonably rely on the law firm's representation); Innes v. Howell Corp., 76 F.3d 702, 711 (6th Cir.
1996) (upholding a jury's verdict against an officer when it found that the corporation's counsel did not
personally represent the officer since actions he took on behalf of the officer in respect to environmental
litigation were done for the corporation's benefit).
67
560 P.2d 1074 (Or. 1977), overruled on other grounds, Lancaster v. Royal Ins. Co., 726
P.2d 371 (Or. 1986).
68
See id. at 1075-76.
69
See id. at 1076.
70
See id.
71
See id. But see Hile v. Firmin, Sprague & Huffnan Co., 595 N.E.2d 1023, 1026 (Ohio Ct.
65

App. 1991) (holding that counsel was not liable to directors by failing to advise them of their potential
personal liability for failing to remit state sales taxes because, unlike Collins, counsel did not act
negligently to the corporation).
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The majority of courts will find that an in-house attorney personally
represents an officer or director only when there is formal consent to such a
relationship. For example, in Budd v. Nixen,72 an attorney was hired to
defend a corporation against a contract dispute.
The president of the
corporation also retained the attorney to represent him personally, and the
attorney filed an answer denying that the president was personally liable.74
However, counsel failed to assert a defense that the president only signed
the contract in his official, representative capacity and therefore, was not
personally liable for the breach of contract. 75 Consequently, the court
found that the attorney could face an action for 76
legal malpractice for failing
president.
the
client,
his
represent
adequately
to
Generally, courts find that "[t]he fact that an attorney represents a
corporation does not thereby make that attorney counsel to the individual
officers and directors thereof." 77 This helps to ensure that the attorney acts
in the best interests of the corporation. Since the corporation is his or her
client, in-house counsel who does not consent to represent an officer or
director should not be held liable merely because the officer or director
mistakenly believed that the attorney provided personal representation. To
ensure that a future dispute does not arise, however, corporate counsel
should advise early in the communication that his or her primary loyalty
belongs to the corporation.78
2.

EMPLOYEES

Sometimes if a cause of action is brought against both the corporation
and an employee, the corporation will want in-house counsel to represent
both the corporate and individual defendant. 79 However, because counsel's
primary duty is to the entity and the defenses asserted by each client may
be different, counsel's representation of the employee may be less effective
than if the employee obtained his or her own counsel.8 Such a situation
72
491 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1971), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Laird v.
Blacker, 279 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
73
See id. at 434.
74
See id. at 435.
75
See id.
76
See id. at 438.
77
Stratton Group v. Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
78
See infra Part IV.A (discussing the actions which counsel should undertake when a
constituent requests advice about personal liability).
79
See Hardin & Lee, supra note 3, at 37. This provides the corporation with assurance that the
events in question are presented in a unified manner. See C. Evan Stewart, For In-House Counsel,
Serving Two Masters Raises Ethical Issues: What are the Constraints on Multiple Representation?,
NAT'L L. J., Aug. 30, 1993, at S19.
so
See Hardin & Lee, supra note 3, at 37.
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could result in the employee filing a malpractice claim against the
corporate counsel, alleging ineffective representation. One reason for the
significant increase in malpractice actions against counsel is due to the
increasing number of layoffs at corporations l and the increasing number of
sexual discrimination lawsuits, 82 both of which make counsel more prone to
lawsuits by disgruntled employees.83
For example, in Goerlich v. Courtney Industries, Inc., a person who
was a shareholder and an employee of a corporation was fired and sued the
corporation claiming breach of a shareholder's agreement which allegedly
gave him employment for the duration of the corporation's existence.8 5
After losing that suit, the former employee/shareholder sued the
corporation's counsel alleging malpractice in drafting the document.8 6 The
court, however, held that the attorney was not liable to the employee
because the corporation-not the corporate counsel-hired the employee. 7
Claims for sexual harassment are another area of the law where the
issue of joint representation frequently arises since both the
harasser/employee and corporation/employer are both often named as
defendants.
The attorney's first step in deciding whether to undertake
dual representation is to determine whether the corporation's and
employee's interests are adverse to each other. In sexual harassment cases,
there are two types of claims which can be raised: (1) quid pro quo claims,
and (2) a claim for hostile work environment. 89
In a quid pro quo claim, a supervisor conditions employment benefits
on a subordinate employee's submission to sexual favors. 90 The
corporation is automatically liable for the supervisor's acts because the
corporation is strictly liable for the acts of its agents. 91 The supervisor, in
particular, may request that in-house counsel defend him against the
81

See, e.g., Announced Layoffs Up: 230,350 Job Cuts So Far in 96, CHI. TRIB., June 11,

1996, at 3 (noting thatjob cuts were 6.5% greater than during the same period in 1993, which was the
year in which the most downsizing in a decade occurred).
82
See, e.g., Kim Stronsnider, Businesses Buy Insurance to ProtectAgainst, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Oct. 13, 1996, at IF (describing how sexual discrimination and harassment complaints have
increased 45% in the past decade in Maine).
83
See Fliflet, supranote 42, at 26.
94
581 A.2d 825 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
85
See id. at 826.
86
See id.
87
See id.
88
See Thomas J. Griffith, Ethical Considerations in the Employee Relations Context, in
CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO LAWYERING LAWS 5.001, 5.042 (Business Laws, Inc. ed., 1996).
89

See Carrie A. Bond, Note, Shattering the Myth: Mediating Sexual HarassmentDisputes in

the Workplace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2489, 2492 (1997).
90
See id.
91
See id. at 2497.
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accusation made by the employee. Dual representation of the corporation
and the supervisor would likely be acceptable since the interests of each
client would not be adverse due to the automatic liability of the employer if
the employee is found liable. 92
A hostile work environment claim arises when an employee is
subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the workplace.93 The
accused corporation can eliminate its liability by immediately taking
actions to remedy the situation; the employee, however, can still be held
individually liable for sexual harassment. 94 The interests of each party in a
sexual harassment case would likely be adverse since the corporation and
the employee would each have different defenses. 95 Therefore, in-house
counsel would be precluded from undertaking the dual representation. If
counsel decided to represent both the employee and the corporation, then
the attorney may be subjected to a malpractice claim by the employee for
ineffective representation since counsel's primary loyalty belongs to the
corporation.
Sometimes, to represent the corporation fully, counsel may have to
conduct an internal investigation and question an employee.
Such
questioning may lead to helpful information for the corporation's defense
but could be potentially harmful to the employee-possibly because the
employee thought that the attorney provided personal representation and
was also looking out for his or her best interests. The employee may
consequently sue the in-house attorney for inadequate representation. 96
Thus, to reduce potential liability, counsel must always inform the
employee to whom his or her primary responsibility belongs (i.e., the
entity) 97
.
Furthermore, such an investigation could lead to tort liability being
imposed upon counsel for alleged false or defamatory statements that were
made because of facts which materialized during the investigation. For
example, in Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.,98 corporate counsel
conducted an internal investigation of a corporation, wherein he found that
an employee was responsible for fraudulent conduct which caused the
corporation to incur liability. 99 The employee was eventually dismissed
92

See id.
See id. at 2492.
See id. at 2497.
95
For example, the main defense of the corporation would be that it took action to remedy the
situation once it learned of the alleged harassment. See id. In contrast, the employee would likely deny
any liability.
96
See Honig, supra note 7, at 8.206.
97
See infra Part IV.A (discussing the attorney's disclosure responsibilities).
98
664 F. Supp. 1490 (D.D.C. 1987).
99
See id. at 1493.
93
94
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from his position and state securities regulators more closely monitored his
conduct thereafterll
The employee sued the corporation's counsel for
libel, invasion of privacy, and misappropriation of the employee's name.
The court held that the employee's claim for compensatory (but not
punitive) damages had sufficient merit to warrant a denial of counsel's
summary judgment motion, thereby suggesting that a corporation's attorney
may incur liability for conducting an internal investigation, t 0t which is one
responsibility of in-house attorneys.
There has been a slight increase in the number of lawsuits (frequently
for defamation) filed against corporate counsel when employees are
terminated. 0 2 Fortunately for in-house counsel, there have been very few
cases which have held counsel liable. Nonetheless, because of the
increased exposure to liability, many corporations more frequently prohibit
their in-house attorneys from representing employees.10 3 This seems the
most equitable course of action since it ensures that both the employee and
the corporation receive independent, objective advice and are fully
represented. Since corporate employees act on behalf of the corporation,
however, they should receive advice from the corporation's counsel when
requested.1 4 Instead of having in-house counsel provide the advice, a
better option would be for the corporation to pay separate representation
for its employees instead of risking
a potential conflict of interest situation
05
counsel.1
corporation's
for the
3. SHAREHOLDERS
The most significant area of corporate law in which third-party liability
has been imdosed on attorneys includes securities offerings and commercial deals. t° The third party who oftentimes attempts to bring a mal100
01

See id. at 1493-94.
See id. at 1517. A federal jury subsequently exonerated the corporate counsel. See Griffen

Bell, in Speech to Corporate Counsel, Says CEO of the Future will be Trained to Disclose Everything
in the Wake of Disaster, CORP. CRIME REP., Nov. 13, 1989, at I [hereinafter Griffen Bell].
102
See, e.g., Mandelblatt v. Perelman, 683 F. Supp. 379, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting the
"growing number of suits seeking to redress adverse employment action on a theory of defamation").
103
See Ruth L Tkacz, In-House Ethics, in CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO LAWYERING
LAWS 1.701, 1.706 (Business Laws, Inc. ed., 1996).
104
Metzloff, supra note 34, at 116. One commentator has suggested that corporate employees
could be considered quasi- or "derivative" clients. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WI1LIAM HODES,
THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.3:108 (2d ed. 1997).
105
The Model Rules allow a corporation to pay for an employee's or director's representation
when corporate counsel's representation would create a conflict of interest, providing that both clients
consent and such a situation maintains counsel's professional independence. See Model Rule 1.7 cmt.
106
See Buchwald, supra note 45, at SI; I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 104, § 7.1, at 490
(stating that counsel face "enormous financial exposure" to nonclients for claims involving large
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practice action is an investor-either a bondholder or stockholder-who
has a claim
based on a violation of the securities laws,10 7 fraud, ° 8 or
•
10910
negligence.
For instance, in Egan v. McNamara, the estate of a
majority shareholder in a close corporation wanted to rescind an agreement
made between the shareholder and the corporation."' The estate claimed
that the corporation's attorney (who was also a director and shareholder of
the corporation) breached his duty to both the corporation and the deceased
12
shareholder, whom the estate claimed the attorney also represented.'
Despite numerous prior representations by the attorney for the deceased
shareholder," 13 the court cited an ethical code section similar to Model Rule
1.13 and held that the attorney "represents the entity, not its individual
shareholders, officers and directors," thereby finding that the attorney's
4
primary concern was to protect the best interests of the corporation.
In a case factually similar to Egan, the court in Fassihi v. Sommers,
Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P.C.," 5 also found that no attorneyclient relationship was created when the attorney who drafted an agreement
for two members of a professional corporation assisted one of the fifty
percent shareholders in ousting the other. 6 Instead, the court found that
the attorney had a fiduciary relationship with the ousted shareholder who
placed his faith, confidence, and trust in the attorney's judgment and
advice." 7 Consequently, the ousted shareholder's fraudulent concealment
claim against the corporate attorney was allowed to proceed on the theory
that counsel failed to reveal his dual representation of the corporation and
the other shareholder.lla

commercial transactions and "significant exposures" under the securities laws).
107
See, e.g., Zendell v. Newport Oil Corp., 544 A.2d 878 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1988) (holding
that counsel may be held liable to investors for an illegal offering of unregistered securities).
108
See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 8.8.
109
See, e.g., Schmidt v. Frankewich, 819 P.2d 1074 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (shareholders who
guaranteed corporate debt); Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040 (7th Cir. 1990) (investors who sued
for securities violations and fraud).
Ho
467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983).
III
See id. at 736-37.
112
See id. at 738.
113

See id. at 736 (describing the personal services as preparing tax returns, drafting wills, and

forming various corporations).
114
Id. at 738.
115

309 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).

116

See id. at 648.

See id.
See id. at 649; see also Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C.,
541 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (Mass. 1989) (stating that "it is fairly arguable that an attorney for a close
corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the individual shareholders").
117

1a
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In some cases, corporate counsel have also been found to owe a duty to
protect the interests of minority shareholders. For instance, in Delano v.
Kitch, 119 a one-third shareholder who was also a director and officer of a
corporation had the corporation's counsel find a buyer for the corporation's
stock.' 20 In return, counsel demanded the right to impose a finder's fee to
which the director/officer/shareholder agreed.' 2 1 Subsequently, counsel
found a buyer who purchased a majority of the stock, which induced the
plaintiffs to sell their stock.'
Those minority shareholders, however,
brought a breach of fiduciary duty action against the corporate attorney
because of his failure to inform them about the finder's fee. Counsel
argued that he did not breach a fiduciary duty allegedly owed to the
minority shareholders and, furthermore, he actually benefitted them by
finding a buyer to whom they were able to sell their shares on the same
terms as the majority shareholders.1 23 The court, nonetheless, agreed with
the minority shareholders and held that counsel did breach his fiduciary
duty since he "violated an established rule that no fiduciary or agent may
serve his own interests or those of a third party by accepting a secret
commission from the third party."' 24
25
Each of the above cases involved shareholders of close corporations.
While the entity concept embodied in the Model Rules may be sufficient
for large, public cororations, it is often difficult to apply to small, closelyheld corporations.
This results from the often difficult situation which
arises in close corporations of attempting to distinguish between the
identities of shareholders and the corporation. Thus, some courts have
been more willing to dispel with the entity: representation theory in close
corporations. For example, in In re Banks, 27 an attorney drafted a ten-year
employment contract for the "creator, organizer, founder, chief executive,
and driving force" of a close, family-held corporation which was also partly
owned by his wife and two daughters.1 2 In addition, the attorney did
personal work for the family, such as drafting their wills and planning their
663 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1981).
See id. at 994.
121
See id.
122
See id.
123
See id. at 996.
124
See id. at 998-99.
125
A close corporation generally has three attributes: (1) non-publicly traded shares, (2) small
number of shareholders, and (3) the officers, directors, and shareholders are the same individuals. See
PAT K. CHEW, DItECroRs' AND OmcERS' UABILrrY 213 (1996).
126
See Lawrence E. Mitchell, ProfessionalResponsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward
a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466, 469 (1989).
127
584 P.2d 284 (Or. 1978).
128
Id. at 285.
119
120
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estate. 29 After the rest of the family gained control of the corporation and
took actions against the principal, the principal brought disciplinary
charges against the attorney because of an allegedly ineffective
employment contract, which the attorney argued that he drafted in 13his
0
capacity as a representative of the corporation, not the principal.
However, the court did not apply the theory of entity representation to the
close corporation because "[a]t the time of the drawing of the contract [the
principal] was the corporation.' 3' Thus, the court held that "[i]n such a
situation 13.2 . .common sense dictates that the corporate entity should be
ignored."'
More definitively, in In re Kinsey, 133 the court noted that the entity
theory in a closely-held corporation would be disregarded only "where the
controlling stockholder was the corporation.' 34
Kinsey involved a
shareholder derivative suit brought by a minority shareholder against the
majority shareholders/directors for an alleged usurpation of a corporate
opportunity, which the majority shareholders allegedly accomplished with
the assistance of the corporation's attorney.' 3 The court upheld the state
bar's disciplinary claim against the attorney because he breached his duty
owed to the corporation when he 36represented the majority shareholders in
an action against the corporation.
Thus, while there is a presumption that corporate attorneys only
represent the close corporation, the presumption is rebuttable. 37 As the
above cases demonstrate, the situation can arise where counsel may
unwittingly have not one, but several clients. This again leads to the
problem of determining if an attorney-client relationship is created. For
example, in Rosman v. Shapiro,13 two shareholders who each owned fifty
percent of a corporation consulted an attorney to create a distribution
contract for the corporation. 139 However, a disagreement developed
between the two shareholders, and the corporation's attorney became the

131

See id.
See id. at 291-92.
id.at 290.

132

Id.

133
134

660 P.2d 660 (Or. 1983).
Id.at 670 n.10.

135
136

See id.at 661-62.
See id. at 671.

129
130

137
See, e.g., Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (stating
that "representing [a close] corporation does not inherently mean also acting as counsel to the individual
directors-shareholders"). Clearly, an attorney who represents only one shareholder in a close
corporation and not the corporation itself does not owe a fiduciary duty to the other shareholders. See,
e.g., Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
138
653 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
139 See id.
at 1444.
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individual attorney for one of the shareholders.14 The other shareholder
subsequently sought to disqualify the attorney from the individual representation because he believed that the counsel was also representing him
individually, thereby creating a conflict of interest. 41 The court agreed and
stated that, when there is a close corporation whose shareholders each have
an equally proportionate ownership interest, it is reasonable for each1 42
shareholder to believe that the attorney represents him or her individually.
The majority of courts have held that minority shareholders do not have
a cause of action for malpractice against the corporate attorney. For
instance, in Palmer v. Fox Software, Inc.,143 a minority shareholder sued
the corporation's attorney for malpractice, alleging a breach of duty
resulting from his assisting corporate officers in allegedly usurping a
corporate opportunity. 1' " The shareholder claimed that, because counsel
had previously provided personal services to him regarding business and
family affairs, he relied on the attorney's advice. 45 However, the court
held that insufficient evidence existed to demonstrate that personal reliance
on the advice provided to the corporation was reasonable; thus, the court
held that the shareholder had no direct cause of action for malpractice and
that Whether
it had to be derivative.'"
an attorney-client relationship will be created with
a
shareholder in a close corporation will depend on the facts of each
47
individual
case.'
confusion
uncertainty
resultstofrom
the inability
of the Model
Rules The
or Model
Codeand
to provide
guidance
a corporate
form
See id. at 1443-45.

140
141
142

See id. at 1445.
See id.; see also Farrington v. Law Firm of Sessions, Fishman, 687 So. 2d 997, 997 (La.

1997) (suit by a 50% shareholder alleging (1) breach of fiduciary duty in failing to provide advice about

the corporate structure, and (2) a conflict of interest against an attorney who represented the corporation
and the other shareholder in enjoining her from allegedly causing harm to the corporation).
107 F.3d 415 (6th Cir.), cert. denied. 1997 WL 437076 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1997) (No. 97-57).
See id. at 416.

143
14
145
14
147

See id. at 420.
See id. at 420-21.
See A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 361, at 6 (1991).
Factors to be considered include:

whether the lawyer affirmatively assumed a duty of representation to the individual
[shareholder], whether the [individual] was separately represented by other counsel when
the [corporation] was created or in connection with its affairs, whether the lawyer had
represented an individual [shareholder] before undertaking to represent the [corporation],
and whether there was evidence of reliance by the individual [shareholder] on the lawyer
as his or her separate counsel, or evidence of the [shareholder's] expectation of personal
representation.
Id. Cf. Mitchell, supra note 126, at 506-08 (proposing a rule for close corporations whereby counsel for

the corporation automatically becomes counsel for each individual shareholder unless instructed to the
contrary).
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which is treated more like a partnership than an entity.148 The key is to
ensure that counsel who represents the corporation "does not thereby (and
without more) become the lawyer for any of the entity's members, agents,
officers or other ...constituents."' 49 Most courts do not appear willing to
extend the attorney-client relationship beyond the corporate entity to other
constituents.15 Nonetheless, corporate counsel for small corporations
should undertake a special effort to clarify whether he or she represents
either the entity or its individual members, or both. 5 1
C. Attorney-DirectorConflicts
The number of counsel who serve on the board of directors of their
corporate employers has been declining during recent years, 1 2 although
about seventeen percent of all public companies have their corporate
counsel serve on the corporation's board. 5 3 Despite the inherent conflict
See Mitchell, supra note 126, at 470-71. The Model Rules also failed to address the fact that
the entity theory has been disregarded for partnerships. See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 104, §
1.13:102, at 390.
149
See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 104, § 1.13:102; see also Lee v. Mitchell, 953 P.2d
414, 426 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that "the mere existence of an attorney-client relationship between
a corporation and an attorney does not in itself create an attorney-client relationshipCor any other basis
for fiduciary dutiesCbetween the attorney and a corporate stockholder"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 361, at 3 (1991) (describing how, when an attorney represents
a partnership, an attorney-client relationship between an individual partner and the attorney is not
automatically created); accord Meehan v. Hopps, 301 P.2d 10, 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (stating that an
attorney representing the corporation does not automatically become liable to a corporate officer merely
because of his corporate representation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
155 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997).
150
See Moore, supra note 37, at 679. Those jurisdictions which do recognize attorney liability
to nonclients take a case-by-case approach in determining whether the attorney should be held liable.
See, e.g., Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1981). However, as one court stated, to allow suits
by third parties in all cases "could conceivably encourage a party to contractual negotiations to forego
personal legal representation and then sue counsel representing the other contracting party for legal
malpractice if the resulting contract later proves disfavorable in some respect." Chalpin v. Brennan,
559 P.2d 680, 682 (Az. Ct. App. 1976). But see Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677
P.2d 1292, 1296 (Az. 1984) (requiring that a case-by-case approach must be used to determine whether
professionals should be liable to third parties).
151
See 1 HAZARD&HODES, supranote 104, § 1.13:104, at 391.
152
See Robert P. Cummins & Megyn M. Kelly, The Conflicting Roles of Lawyer as Director,
148

LITIG., Fall 1996, at 48 (noting the declining number of counsel who sit on boards); Barbara Franklin,
Cutting Their Losses: Insurers Seek to Limit Exposure Due to Lawyers, N.Y. LJ., June 27, 1991, at 5
(stating that the number of lawyers serving on boards of directors has been declining over the last ten
years).
153
See Gail Diane Cox, For Lawyers Lure of the Boardroom Has Its Perils: Serving on a
Client's Board Can Lead to Conflicts that Could Get an Attorney Fired or Sued, NAT'L LJ., July 1,
1996, at B1. Specifically, 78 out of the 250 largest industrial corporations in the United States had
corporate counsel who served on their corporate clients' board, as did nearly half of the nation's largest

20

UNIVERSITY OFMIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:1

that can arise by undertaking the dual role, the Model Rules currently
permit it.154 Furthermore, after a recent two-year study, the ABA
concluded that such a relationship should not be15 prohibited, but stated that
it should be discouraged in most circumstances. T
Some corporations prefer having counsel serve on the corporations
board of directors for several reasons. First, it allows counsel to become
more knowledgeable about the affairs of the corporation, thereby allowing
the attorney to provide more effective legal advice.156 Second, since the
board must be fully informed about critical issues facing the corporation,
counsel can provide greater guidance sooner in the transaction, thereby
heading off potentially greater problems in the future. 57 Third, counsel's
role as a director creates a perception that he or she is an equal partner who
has the same liabilities as the other directors, thereby providing the other
board members with a greater level of comfort in counsel's legal advice
and opinions. 5 8 Finally, serving on the board of directors allows counsel
to become an integral part of the business, thereby helping to quiet the
continuous questioning of the corporate legal department's necessity. 59
However, the enhanced liabilities which attorney-directors faceW
should make counsel seriously reconsider a decision to accept a position as
financial institutions. See Dominic Bencivenga, Corporate Boards: ABA Sees Inherent Risks in
Lawyers' Dual Role, N.Y. L.J., July 17, 1997, at 5 [hereinafter "Bencivenga, Corporate Boards"].
154
See Model Rule 1.7 cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 216 cmt. (d) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (allowing counsel to serve both as an
attorney and director since the dual roles often compliment each other); Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v.
Pepicelli, Pepicelli, Watts & Youngs, P.C., 821 F.2d 216, 220-21 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that "an
attorney may simultaneously act as a lawyer and as an officer or director of a business"). But see, Code
of Professional Ethics of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Rule 101,
nterpretation 101-1(B)(1) (specifically prohibiting accountants from serving on their clients' boards of
directors).
155
See Bencivenga, CorporateBoards,supra note 153, at 5.
156
See James H. Cheek, Ill & Howard H. Lamar, I1, Lawyers as Directors of Clients: Conflicts
of Interest, PotentialLiability and Other Pitfalls, 712 PRAC. L. INST./CoRP. 461, 464 (1990); Watkins
& Bird, supra note 9, at 2.203; Robert H. Mundheim, Should Codes of Professional Responsibility
ForbidLawyers to Serve on Board of Corporationfor Which They Act as Counsel, 33 BUS. LAW. 1607
(1978) (stating that the increased liability of being both counsel and a director will ensure that counsel
fully understands the corporation's business).
157 See Cheek & Lamar, supra note 156, at 464; Watkins & Bird, supra note 9, at 2.203;
Dominic Bencivenga, In-House Counsel Redefine Their CorporateRole, N.Y. L.J., June 6, 1996, at 5
[hereinafter Bencivenga, In-House Counsel]; Mundheim, supra note 156, at 1607 (stating that being
both counsel and a director provides the attorney with greater access to the board and the ability to
provide early warnings about potential problems).
158
See Cheek & Lamar, supra note 156, at 464; Watkins & Bird, supra note 9, at 2.203.
159 See Bencivenga, In-House Counsel, supranote 157, at 5.
160
See Robert E. O'Malley & Harry H. Schneider, Danger: Lawyer on Board, 79 A.B.A. J.
102, 102 (1993). The ABA has been concerned with this problem for some time. See... in the Spirit
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a director of the corporation which they represent. This dual role creates a
problem for the attorney-director as being not only counsel to the
corporation but also becoming his or her own client. 6 This arises because
as counsel, he or she represents the corporation; however, as a board
member who acts in the best interests of the corporation, counsel also
becomes one of the corporation's constituencies (as a board member)
whom he or she also represents derivatively. Thus, when deciding whether
to sit on a client's board, counsel must ensure that the dual roles as attorney
and director do not conflict and that there is not a "material risk that the
dual role will
compromise the lawyer's independence of professional
162
judgment."'
For those attorneys who choose to serve as directors, the difficulties
that confront them continue to increase.163 In a study of outside counsel, a
lawyer who also serves as a director is much more likely to be sued for
legal malpractice than an attorney who is not a director of his or her
client.' 64 One reason for this enhanced liability risk results from the
attorney-director being held to a higher standard of care than either a
director or an attorney who each act as independent persons. 65 Because
they are directors, attorney-directors are required to use "the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances" in fulfilling their fiduciary duties.166 However, the
heightened level of liability arises because of the "special background,
qualifications and management responsibilities" 67which the attorneydirector possesses since he or she is also an attorney.'
For example, in the historic case of Escott v. BarChris Constructors
Corp.,168 an attorney-director was sued in his capacity as a director because
of false statements contained in the prospectus which he prepared. 69 In

of Public Service:' A Blueprintfor the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 281
(1986).
161
See O'Malley & Schneider, supra note 160, at 102.
162
Model Rule 1.7 cmt. However, sitting on a board automatically eliminates counsel's
independence and objectiveness. See O'Malley & Schneider, supra note 160, at 102; see also infra
notes 406-08 and accompanying text (discussing the independence of counsel).
163
See Cummins & Kelly, supranote 152, at 48.
164 See O'Malley & Schneider, supra note 160, at 102. Furthermore, many of the cases in
which an attorney has been found liable for securities violations have involved general counsel who is
also a director. See Harry J.Haynsworth, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, the Model Rules,
and the Business Lawyer, A.L.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 35, Apr. 2, 1996, at 85 n.72.
165 See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
i6
REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1994).
167
Id.
168 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
169
See id. at 689-90.
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preparing the registration materials, the court found that the attorney had
the mistaken belief that the information provided by other corporate
officers was accurate. 170 The court held the attorney-director liable under
section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act because, in his dual positions as both
an attorney and a director, he should have taken steps to ensure the
accuracy of the information which was provided to him.' 7 1 The court
further stated that this "does not establish an unreasonably high standard in
other cases for company counsel who are also directors.'2
Moreover, the court in BarChrisconsidered the attorney-director to be
an outside director. 73 Almost all in-house attorney-directors would likely
be considered inside directors because of their presumably intimate
familiarity with both the legal and business aspects of the corporation.
Consequently, an in-house attorney who is also a director would have an
even higher level of responsibility as an inside director. "Inside directors
with intimate knowledge of corporate affairs and of the particular
transactions will be expected to make a more complete investigation and
have more extensive knowledge of facts supporting or contradicting
inclusions in the registration statements than outside directors."' 174 Such a
person would be almost a "guarantor of accuracy" and would have no
reasonable belief in relying on the statements of others. t75 Therefore, the
potential liability for in-house counsel who serves on the board of directors
is significantly greater than for a director who is not an expert in both
corporate and legal matters.
For instance, in Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Ham,' a director and corporate
counsel purchased a leasehold interest for himself when he should have
known that the land was an opportunity which belonged to the
corporation.
The corporation sued the attorney-director for constructive
fraud, claiming that he violated the fiduciary duty which he owed to the
corporation as a director.178 The court agreed and held the attorney-director
170

See id. at 690.

171

See id. Although the attorney was not required to conduct a full-fledged audit of the figures,

he was required to check the information which was easily verifiable. See id.
172
Id. at 692.
173
See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
(noting BarChris'streatment of the attorney as an outside director, despite his being a director for eight
months). An outside director is one who is not employed by the corporation on a full-time basis. See
CHEW, supra note 125, at 18.
174
Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 578.
175
Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 1 SEC. L.
REV. 3, 25 (1969); see also Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 580.
176
589 P.2d 173 (Nev. 1979).
177

See id. at 174.

178

See id. at 175-76.
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could be liable because (1) as a director, he had a duty to inform the
corporation about the opportunity, and (2) as counsel, he had an additional
duty to inform the corporation both about the opportunity
and the
79
corporation's rights in taking advantage of the opportunity.'
Similarly, in Blackely v. Lisac,1s° several corporate shareholders filed a
class action lawsuit against, among others, the corporation's attorneydirector who prepared a securities offering prospectus which contained
several misrepresentations."'
The attorney-director claimed that the
shareholders were suing him in his capacity as an attorney, not as a
director.1 2 Consequently, the attorney used a due diligence defense,
claiming that his reliance on information provided to him by the corporate
officers fulfilled his fiduciary obligation.
However, the court found that,
because of his dual role as both an attorney and director, his "role was...
'beyond a lawyer's normal one,' and he is held to even a higher standard of
care. , , 8
In addition to possible liability exposure for failing to exercise a higher
standard of care, another area of potential liability for any in-house
counsel, but especially for an attorney-director, arises because he or she
must wear two hats: a business and a legal one. To provide sound legal
advice, it is important that in-house counsel be aware of the strategic
business plan and the commercial objectives to be achieved before he or
she renders legal advice. Furthermore, to provide such advice competently,
counsel must understand the corporation's objectives: how they were
formed, how they are to be achieved, and the desired outcome.
The
concern is that the attorney-director's legal advice may be evaluated based
on his or her business expertise and that such business advice may be
evaluated based on his legal expertise, 1 6 thereby creating problems
not
only for the corporation's counsel but also for the corporation itself.18 7
179

See id. at 175.

18o
181

357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Or. 1972).
See id. at 259-60.

182

See id. at 266.

183

See 1933 Securities Act § 1 (b)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77 K(b)(3) (1933) (commonly referred to

as the due diligence defense).
14
M *357 F. Supp. at 266 (quoting SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968)).
185 See Scott E. Squillace, In-House Practitioners: 'Real' Lawyers?, INT'L BUS. LAW., Dec.
1996, at 529.
186 See Cummins, supra note 152, at 51; see also infra notes 388-99, 422-34 and accompanying
text (discussing the problems associated with distinguishing between legal and business advice).
187
One frequently litigated area concerns the attorney-client privilege and whether the advice
provided is business advice (to which the privilege does not apply) or legal advice (to which the
privilege does apply). The vast area of attorney-client privilege is beyond the scope of this article;
however, for good discussions of the topic, see Scott R. Flucke, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Corporate Setting: Counsel's Dual Role as Attorney and Executive, 62 UMKC L. REV. 549 (1994);
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The easiest way to avoid potential conflicts and liabilities that could
arise from attorney-director situations is simply to choose not to serve on
the board. Serving as a director conflicts with the role of an attorney,
which is that of an advisor. Since attorney-directors must have the
knowledge of both a businessperson and a lawyer in order to fulfill the
fiduciary duties in their respective capacities, they should be held to a
higher standard of care than either a director or an attorney who acts in just
one capacity. Thus, courts have increasingly held attorney-directors to a
higher standard of care and have more frequently held them liable because
of the dual knowledge which they must possess.
Ill. MAJOR AREAS OF THE LAW GIVING RISE TO LIABILITY

The majority of actions brought against corporate counsel are for
professional malpractice, which generally has four elements: (1) an
attorney-client relationship has been created, 18 (2) breach of a duty, (3)
proximate cause between the plaintiff's injury and the attorney's
negligence, and (4) proof of actual damages caused by the negligence.
The number of malpractice claims filed have increased in frequency over
the last decade. 190 An exhaustive list of every area of the law in which inhouse counsel may be held liable is not possible. However, this section
discusses some of the major areas of the law under which corporate
counsel, in particular, have the greatest potential of being subjected to
liability: breaching a fiduciary duty, breaching a duty owed under ERISA,
violating the securities laws, aiding and abetting a director or officer in
violating the law, violating the environmental laws, infringing upon
intellectual property rights, committing antitrust violations, erring in
commercial transactions, and providing incorrect advice in opinion letters.
A. Breach of FiduciaryDuty
Corporate counsel has a fiduciary relationship as an attorney with the
corporation for which he or she works. 19' That fiduciary duty is breached
Business Laws, Inc., Corporate Counsel's Guide to the Attorney-Client Privilege, in CORPORATE
COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO LAWYERING LAws 3.001 (1996); Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Sanctifying Secrecy:
The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157 (1993).
188
If there is a lack of privity, then courts sometimes allow suits for a non-malpractice tort.
19
See Lynn A. Epstein, Post-Settlement Malpractice: Undoing the Done Deal, 35 CATH. U.
L REV. 453,462-63 (1997).
190
See I MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 1.6, at 20 (noting the increasing number of
malpractice claimsCalthough the rate of increase is decreasing).
191
See Bryan v. Bartlett, 435 F.2d 28, 37 (8th Cir. 1970) (holding a corporate attorney to the
same fiduciary standard as a director of the corporation); Cf Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1389
(8th Cir. 1979) (reasoning that, since a bank's directors and officers owed no fiduciary duties to the
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when counsel serves the interests of third parties instead of the corporation
itself. 192 For example, in International Community Corp. v. Young, 193 a
corporation's attorney was accused of breaching his fiduciary duty owed to
the corporation when he prepared documents that conveyed corporate
property to a trust owned by a corporate officer.' 94 The court held that the
attorney could be liable for breaching his fiduciary duty if he knew or
should have known that he was assisting the corporate officer in usurping a
corporate opportunity.19
In-house counsel can also be subjected to liability for failing to take
sufficient actions upon learning that a corporate representative has
breached a fiduciary duty, which would cause substantial harm to the
corporation. Counsel has the responsibility to act with reasonable diligence
in representing the corporation.
Although counsel is not designated as a
"corporate watchdog," 9 7 counsel must consider the best interests of the
corporation before taking any action. 198 Specifically, the Model Rules
require counsel to undertake certain steps to protect the best interests of the
corporation when he or she "knows" that a corporate agent is engaging in
or intends to engage in actions which violate the law. 199 Failure to take the
necessary steps could result in liability.
For example, in FDIC v. Clark,200 two corporate attorneys represented
a bank whose officers, Nowfel and Eynden, conducted a seven-month
"heist money scheme" whereby two bank officers approved fraudulent,
non-collateralized, poorly documented loans to Vecchio and Rizzo who
were also involved in the scheme. 2°1 The bank's attorneys allegedly
became aware of the scheme when Vecchio and Rizzo sued the bank
seeking to cancel repayment of their loan obligation because of the
improper documentation procedures. 202 The corporate attorneys questioned

CEO, the bank's attorney also owed no fiduciary duty to the CEO).
192
See Staffenberg, supra note 14, at 414. A breach of fiduciary duty claim can be brought not
only for malpractice but also as a separate tort cause of action against an attorney if there was no
malpractice. See, e.g., Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1997) (stating that clients can sue
attorneys for the tort of breach of fiduciary duty as a cause of action separate from malpractice if no
malpractice occurred).
193
486 So. 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
194
See id. at 630.
195
See id.
196
See Model Rule 1.3.
1 HAZARD & HODES, supranote 104, § 1.13:301, at 410.1.
See Model Rule 1.13(a).
199 - See Model Rule 1.13(b); see also supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
197

198

200

978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir. 1992).

201

See id. at 1546.

202

See id. at 1547.
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Nowfel about the suit and Nowfel said "that it was simply a
misunderstanding between borrowers and would be resolved." 20 3 The
attorneys took no further actions, and the scheme continued until it
eventually caused the bank to lose $1.7 million. 20 4 The FDIC then brought
an action against the attorneys. The attorneys argued that they could not be
held liable when their client lies and defrauds them. 5 Nonetheless, the
court held the attorneys liable because "the presence of fraud did not cancel
the attorney's duty of due care" which could have been fulfilled had they
conducted a reasonable, independent investigation instead of merely
relying on the incorrect facts provided by the officer. 2°6
Conversely, in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell,2°7 the court held that
the bank's attorneys did not have a duty to conduct an independent
investigation. 2° 8 In that case, the law firm performed various services for a
savings and loan, including forming the institution, performing work on
loans, providing advice about liabilities of the directors and officers,
opining about regulatory matters, and working on the S&L's public
offering. 209 After the S&L failed, the RTC filed an action against the law
firm claiming that counsel did not fulfill its duty to investigate one of the
substantially large loans which was issued in violation of federal
regulations and which gave rise to the institution's failure.210 The court
found that the law firm was not under a duty to be vigilant about possible
regulatory violations, and it was reasonable for them to rely on the S&L's
internal compliance procedures; thus, the court held that the law firm was
211
not liable since it had no duty to investigate.
The Blasdell case can be distinguished, however, since the attorneys
who represented the S&L were outside counsel who were not as intimately
familiar with the S&L's operations as in-house counsel would have been.
In-house counsel more frequently have been held to a higher standard of
care because they have greater access to corporate information and have
more knowledge about how the corporation operates. Therefore, most
courts have held that in-house counsel do have an obligation to alert the
organization to wrongdoings by corporate officers and to take sufficient
action to verify the information which is provided to them.212
203

Id.

204

See id. at 1548.

WS

See id. at 1549.
Id.

206

2o

154 F.R.D. 675 (D. Ariz. 1993).

208

See id. at 688.

2M
210

See id. at 678.
See id. at 680.

211
212

See id. at 688-89.
See William A. Hanock, What Is an Attorney's Responsibility to Warn?, in CORPORATE
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The extent of counsel's duty to investigate will depend on the
reliability of the information that they receive. 3 Sometimes this
information comes from informal channels of communication such as
conversations which are overheard during lunch. The corporate attorney
must decide how much credence needs to be given to such information,
which may be merely gossip or rumor. If, however, the information is
provided directly by a third person, then it may be more reliable and
warrant greater attention. The reliability of such information could be
determined based on the prior dealings which the attorney has had with the
information's provider. Counsel are generally allowed to assume that
corporate directors and officers perform their duties in good faith, 2 14 but
they can not turn a blind eye and make such an assumption when
circumstances suggest otherwise.
Counsel must also be sure that the suspected fraud or criminal activity
is actually being committed before making such a disclosure. Otherwise,
he or she could face liability for an improper disclosure. For example, in X
Corp. v. Doe, 2 15 in-house counsel attempted to disclose 4,800 pages of
documents which he believed contained information about a longtime fraud
being committed by the corporation against the federal government. 216
However, the corporation sued the previously fired attorney for, among
other things, breach of fiduciary duty for failing to maintain a confidential
relationship, which allegedly occurred when counsel disclosed the
information to his private attorney when he filed a qui tam action against
the corporation.2 7 The court, however, found that counsel would further
breach his fiduciary duty by publicly disclosing the documents because
confidential information can be revealed only when it "clearly" establishes
fraud; the documents in this case were only "arguably suggestive of a
regulatory violation.""' Although the court merely entered an injunction
against counsel's public disclosure of the documents, 2 19 this case suggests
COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO LAWYERING LAWs 1.601, 1.603 (Business Laws, Inc. ed, 1996).

Regardless,

corporate counsel cannot incur liability to a minority shareholder because of a breach of fiduciary duty
to the corporation. See, e.g., Felty v. Hartweg, 523 N.E.2d 555, 557 (III. App. Ct. 1988) (stating that,
even if corporate counsel knew that he was expected to protect minority shareholders, his breaching of a
fiduciary duty to the corporation which harmed the shareholders would not give rise to them for a
breach of fiduciary duty cause of action).
213
See T. William Porter, Corporate Legal Opinions in Texas-An Overview of Potential
Liabilities,BULL. BUS. L SEC. STATE BAR TEx., Nov. 1986, at 4.
214
See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 104, § 1.13:301, at 410.1.
215
816 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Va. 1993).
216
See id. at 1088-1091.
217
See id. at 1091.
218 Id. at 1091-1092.
See id. at 1097.
219
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the carefulness with which counsel must proceed before blowing the
whistle against their corporate clients and officers within the corporation.2 20
Although counsel may not even know about management's fraud or
self-dealing, liability may still result. Since in-house counsel have the
general responsibility of ensuring that the corporation complies with the
law, they should be required to undertake a more extensive investigation
is
and be placed under a higher duty of inquiry than outside counsel. This 221
directors,
of
board
corporation's
the
on
sits
counsel
if
true
especially
since an attorney-director should not only be intimately familiar with the
legal aspects of the corporation but also its business operations. Thus,
counsel must be aware of situations that could give rise to a claim for
breaching their legal fiduciary duty to the corp 6 ration and must ensure that
they undertake their due diligence responsibilities.
B. ERISA
Corporate counsel who advise ERISA (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act) 222 plans are also under a separate fiduciary duty. Under
ERISA, corporate counsel can be held liable not only as a fiduciary 223 but
also as a nonfiduciary. 22 Numerous cases have decided whether an
a pension plan is a fiduciary. 22 Fiduciary226liability
attorney who represents
....
It is a
arises when counsel has discretionary authority over plan assets.
functional definition which focuses on the actual duties performed,
independent of the title held by counsel.227 An attorney who represents a
pension plan does not automatically become a fiduciary, however, as long
220

A full discussion about attorneys who blow the whistle because of allegedly illegal activities

committed by their corporate clients and the retaliatory discharge claims that usually result is beyond
the scope of this article. However, for good discussions of this topic, see H. Lowell Brown, The
Dilemma of Corporate Counsel Faced with Client Misconduct: Disclosure of Client Confidences or
Constructive Discharge, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 777 (1996); John Jacob Kobus, Jr., Note, Establishing
Corporate Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Patricia
Leigh O'Dell, Retaliatory Discharge: Corporate Counsel in a Catch-22, 44 ALA. L. REV. 573 (1993).
221
See supra Part I.C (discussing the enhanced liabilities of attorney-directors); see also,
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding that the attorneydirector had no knowledge of material facts but was held liable because he could have easily obtained
the information).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
222
See id. § 1002(21)(A).
223
224
See id. § 1106.
225
Most cases hold that counsel who merely provide legal representation are not plan
fiduciaries. See, e.g., Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Welfare Fund v. Gentner,
50 F.3d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1995); Chapman v. Klemick, 3 F.3d 1508, 1510 (1 th Cir. 1993).
Liss v. Smith, 991 F. Supp. 278, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
226
227

See Blatt v. Marshall & Lassman, 812 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1987).
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as he or she performs only the ministerial tasks and day-to-day activities
required to provide legal advice to the plan.2 2
Nonfiduciary liability of counsel arises under one of two theories.
First, counsel can be held liable for participating in transactions that are
prohibited by ERISA. 229 Second counsel can be held liable when they
knowingly participate in a trustee's breach of fiduciary duties.230 This
occurs when a trustee breaches a fiduciary duty, counsel knows that the
trustee is a fiduciary who is breaching the duty, and damages resulted from
the breach of duty.231 In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates,232 wherein it held that nonfiduciaries are not liable for
money damages (i.e., legal damages) resulting from a fiduciary's breach of
duty as long as the professional services which the nonfiduciaries provide
are merely advisory in nature and they do not become fiduciaries
themselves. 233 Lower courts, however, have subsequently interpreted the
Mertens decision very narrowly and have allowed recovery from
nonfiduciaries
for restitution and other equitable relief (i.e., equitable
234
damages).
Nonetheless, corporate attorneys can be held liable both as fiduciaries
and as nonfiduciaries. For example, in Liss v. Smith,235 an attorney who
advised ERISA plan trustees was sued as both a fiduciary and nonfiduciary
for breach of his fiduciary duty. 236 Counsel's alleged nonfiduciary breach
of duty arose from his failure to advise the trustees about their duties to
consider investment risk, to obtain professional advice about investments,
to use benchmarks to assess performance, to monitor broker fees and
commissions, and to diversify assets. 237 The court held that a willful failure
to advise constituted a knowing participation in a breach of the trustees'
fiduciary duty for which the attorney could be held liable as both a
fiduciary and a nonfiduciary. 238
228
229

See Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir. 1996).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (1998); id. § 1106 (listing the prohibited transactions); see,

e.g., Liss, 991 F. Supp. at 306; Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270, 285-87 (3d Cir, 1995); Reich v. Rowe,
20 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1994); Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1988).
230
See Liss, 991 F. Supp. at 304.
231

See id. at 305.

232

508 U.S. 248 (1993).

233

See id. at 272.

234

See, e.g., Reich v. Stangl, 73 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the ERISA

statute does not bar suits against nonfiduciaries for equitable relief); see also Concha v. London, 62
F.3d 1493, 1503-04 (9th Cir. 1995); Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270, 287 (3d Cir. 1995); Reich v.
Rowe, 20 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 1994).
235
991 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
236

See id. at 302.

237

See id. at 308.

238

See id. at 303-06.
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Courts have been more willing to assess equitable damages against
counsel as nonfiduciaries who represent ERISA plans. The extent to which
counsel goes beyond merely advising a pension plan's trustee will
determine whether they will also be held liable for a direct breach of
fiduciary duties owed to the plan.
C. Securities Laws
Liability arising under the securities laws likely provides the greatest
area of concern to corporate attorneys since there are many aspects in
which counsel can be involved: drafting merger agreements and offerings
statements, creating lending agreements, conducting investor negotiations,
issuing opinions, and drafting disclosure documents. There are generally
two ways that counsel can be held liable for securities matters:
professional malpractice or direct primary liability to an investor due to
violations of the securities laws. 239 The second type of liability arises
because any person-including in-house counsel-who effects "material
misstatements or omissions concerning publicly traded securities will have
liability to the investing public" (i.e., third parties).2 °
In 1991, the SEC issued a report in response to the Salomon Brothers
debacle wherein the agency explained the supervisory responsibilities of
corporate counsel.241 In In re Gutfreund, Salomon's chief legal officer
became aware of a criminal act committed by a senior officer who
submitted a false bid. Although counsel advised that the action was
criminal and should be reported to the SEC, he took no further action
himself to disclose the false bid. The SEC, however, found that counsel in
such situations would have the obligation under section 15(b)(4)(E) of the
1934 Exchange Act "to take affirmative steps to ensure that appropriate
action is taken to address the misconduct."24 2 The SEC's purpose in
issuing the report was to require ". . . that [counsel has] to take action, that
it isn't good enough to simply advise."2 4 3 Taking action against attorneys
239
1982).
24

See, e.g., Brennan v. Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, 450 A.2d 740, 747 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Honig, supra note 7, at 8.203; see also supra notes 106-51 (discussing third-party liability to

shareholders).
241
See In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) & 85,067 (Dec. 3, 1992).
242
Id. at 83,608-609. Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the 1934 Exchange Act makes it unlawful for
anyone to assist or counsel a broker or dealer in committing a violation of the securities laws.
243
Jonathan M. Moses, SEC Spotlights Role of In-House Counsel in Salomon Report, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 7, 1992, at B3 (quoting Joseph . Goldstein, SEC's associate director of enforcement in
1992); see also In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17597 [1981 Transfer Binder],
Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) & 82, 847 (Feb. 28, 1981) (holding that, if counsel's advice is not followed,
then counsel must take affirmative steps to avoid being co-opted into an ongoing fraud); SEC v.
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forces them to monitor clients more closely and deters a corporation from
engaging in misconduct. 2"
Such a requirement places a significant responsibility on in-house
counsel and can pose a dilemma. For example, in-house counsel may learn
about management's attempted fraud or self-dealing in connection with a
securities offering. Such conduct could occur by failing to make full
disclosures to the SEC, investors, or the public, all of whom are
constituents of the corporation. In-house counsel has the difficult task of
deciding what actions are in the best interests of the corporation. Perhaps
management's conduct is necessary to raise the money needed to keep the
corporation out of bankruptcy, thereby protecting the investor constituents.
However, not reporting the alleged fraud may get the corporation and the
corporate attorney into significant trouble with the SEC and result in the
imposition of a substantial fine. Such a situation must be approached with
extreme caution.
Despite the SEC's hard line and clear rule emanating from the
Gutfreund report, there have been an increasing number of lawsuits against
attorneys who allegedly have failed to take sufficient action upon learning
of an ongoing fraud committed by their corporate client.245 Investors have
brought many of these claims, alleging that they relied on false 246
or
misleading offering materials which were prepared by corporate counsel.
Some investors have also brought claims against counsel on the theory
that, by merely providing routine legal services such as preparing the
offering materials and issuing legal opinions, 247counsel assisted the
corporation and its officers in committing the fraud.
Most courts have required that plaintiffs bringing a cause of action for
reliance on false or misleading materials to plead scienter and to

National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding counsel liable as an aider
and abetter under § 17(a) for assisting in misleading shareholders during the closing of a merger
because counsel failed to disclose updated financial information which was material and known).
244
Ann Maxey, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Securities Lawyers: New Remedies vs. Old
Policies, 22 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 537, 537 (1997).
245
See Reycraft, supra note 24, at 612.
246
See, e.g., Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainwright & Co., 580 F. Supp. 604 (D. Mass. 1984)
(purchasers of partnership interest alleged violations of §§ 12(1), 12(2), and 17(a) of the 1933 Securities
Act and Rule IOb-5 of the 1934 Exchange Act).
247
See, e.g., Seidel v. Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 616 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (D.N.H. 1985)
(holding that law firm could be held liable under § 12(2) of the 1934 Exchange Act because it was
"uniquely positioned to ask relevant questions, acquire material information, or disclose [the] findings"
(quoting Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (D. Minn. 1981))); Koehler
v. Pulvers, 606 F. Supp. 164, 168 (S.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that counsel could be liable under ' 12 of
the 1934 Exchange Act although he was not in privity of contract with the investor because he did not
draft the prospectus).
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demonstrate that counsel had knowledge that their actions were in violation
of the securities laws .248 However, some courts have held that, even if
counsel did not know about management's actions, liability could still
result as an aider and abettor if the actions were so flagrantly obvious that
they should have known about the illegal conduct. 249
Thus, in working with the issuer of a corporation's securities, counsel
has a responsibility to ensure that the information which he or she uses to
draft documents is updated, thereby requiring counsel to undertake an
affirmative duty of inquiry.
For example, in FDIC v. O'Melveny &
Meyers,25 ' counsel who prepared private placement documents relied solely
on the information provided by the S&L's two principals and sole
shareholders. 252
The issuers, however, attempted to disguise the
institution's dwindling net worth, which would have easily become known
had counsel spoken directly to the corporation's accountants. The law firm
argued that it had neither a duty to uncover its client's fraud nor a duty to
advise the S&L or regulators of that fraud. 253 Nonetheless, the court held
that securities counsel must make a reasonable, independent investigation
to detect and correct false or misleading materials.254
The SEC has also imposed cease and desist orders against attorneys for
negligently representing their corporate clients. For example, in In re
Candies', Inc., 255 the SEC obtained a consent order from attorneys who
negligently misinterpreted the safe-harbor provisions of Regulation S.2 56 In
248

See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979) (requiring the plaintiff

to plead those events which "give rise to a strong inference that the defendants had knowledge of the
[primary securities law] violation"); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983) (requiring
that an aider and abetter have knowledge of the securities law violation); see also Renovitch v.
Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040, 1046 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that if there is no direct evidence of scienter,
then a court can also look for indirect evidence of scienter, demonstrated by whether counsel profited
from the alleged fraud).
249
See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that "a lawyer, no more than
others, can escape liability for fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily understand").
The court also stated, however, that counsel should not be held liable for technical information provided
by the client which is beyond the understanding of counsel (such as how a corporation's chemical
processing plant operates). See id.
250
Tower C. Snow, Jr. et al., Defending Securities Class Actions, C123 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE
OF STUDY, June 2, 1995, at 710. In-house counsel likely have a greater duty to inquire than outside
counsel since in-house attorneys have greater access to corporate information. Accord RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 155 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997).
251
969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79(1994).
252

See id. at 747.

253
254
255
256

See id. at 748.
See id. at 749.
Exchange Act Release No. 36,865, 61 SEC Docket 0938 (Dec. 14, 1996).
See id. at 0944. The SEC noted that the sales, however, were in compliance with Regulation

S. See id.
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In re Goodman,257 the SEC obtained a consent order against an attorney
who negligently failed to discover that his corporate client-not the
attorney himself-had prepared a misleading disclosure document.2
Consequently, the SEC's willingness to impose a negligence standard
against corporate counsel heightens the level of scrutiny and inquiry which
corporate attorneys must undertake.
Finally, one area of particular concern for counsel who serve as a
director is the potential liability under section 11 of the 1933 Securities
Act. Section 11 contains the anti-fraud provision of the securities laws and
states who will be held liable for any untrue statement of material fact or
omission of material fact which should have been stated to prevent the
registration statement from being misleading. 259 Under that section,
counsel is not specifically liable unless he or she signed or expertised the
registration statement. 26 However, counsel who also serve as directors
significantly enhance their liability because directors are automatically
liable under the statute. 26 For example, in BarChris262 and Feit,2 6 3 lawyerdirectors were held liable under section 11 because of the higher standard
of care which they owed to the corporation. If those attorneys.were
not
2 4
directors, however, then they may not have been held liable.
D. Aiding & Abetting Liability
The number of aiding and abetting claims has increased significantly
over the last two decades. 26 To be held liable as an aider and abetter,
counsel (1) must know of sufficient information to justify an inquiry into
the potential violation, and (2) have substantially assisted in achieving the
violation. 266 Aiding and abetting liability can arise in several areas of the
law such as securities and ERISA, including breach of fiduciary duty.
257
258
29
260

Exchange Act Release No. 36,951, 6 SEC Docket 2690 (Dec. 14, 1995).
See id. at 2698-99.
Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k (West 1998).
See, e.g., Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (D. Minn. 1981)

(holding that a law firm was not liable as a primary violator under section 11 since none of the firm's
attorneys signed or expertised any part of the registration statement).
261
See 1933 Securities Act § I1(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k (West 1998).
262
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
263
Feit v. Lesco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
264
See Ahem v. Gaussoin, 611 F. Supp. 1465, 1482 (D. Or. 1985) (distinguishing Feit and
BarChrisbecause the attorneys in those cases were also directors).
265
See, e.g., Patrick J. McNulty & Daniel J. Hanson, Liability for Aiding and Abetting by
Silence or Inaction: An Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L. J. 14, 15-16 (1993) (describing the
significant increase in aiding and abetting claims for securities law violations).
266
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1977). See generally, Stanley Pietrusiak,
Jr., Comment, Changing the Nature of CorporateRepresentation: Attorney Liabilityfor Aiding and
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SECURITIES LAWS

The securities laws have probably provided the most fodder for claims
of aiding and abetting liability, particularly under section 10(b) or rule 1Ob5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Generally, however,
liability will not be imposed unless counsel has a duty of disclosure to third
parties. 267 For example, in Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co., 26 a law firm
represented the issuer's underwriters who prepared the offering statement
for securities, which allegedly omitted material facts about the
investment. 269 Although a jury found in favor of the investor plaintiffs, the
Fifth Circuit reversed.
The court found that the law firm knew that the
FBI, SEC, and the National Association of Securities Dealers were
investigating the issuer; did not itself investigate what the issuer had done
to warrant the investigations; made material changes to the offering
materials without inquiring about the reason for such changes; and failed to
investigate the truth of the statements in the offering materials. 27'
Nonetheless, the court held that the law firm could not be liable, despite the
reckless disregard of its duties. 272 The reason was that the services
provided by the law firm were for routine, everyday activities, and there
was no proof that 273
the firm was actually aware of its participation in the
fraudulent scheme.
In 1994, the Supreme Court decided the historic case of Central Bank
of Denver, N.A. v. FirstInterstate Bank of Denver, N.A.274 In that case, the
Court held that no private cause of action existed for aiding and abetting
liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Act. 2757 This decision
effectively overruled the precedent in all eleven circuits.
However, in
the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Congress effectively
overruled Central Bank and enacted sections 21(d) and 20(f) of the

Abetting the Breach of FiduciaryDuty, 28 ST. MARY'S LJ.213 (1996).
267
See J. Randolph Evans & Ida Patterson Dorvee, Attorney Liabilityfor Assisting Clients with
Wrongful Conduct: Establishedand Emerging Bases of Liability, 45 S.C. L. REV. 803, 822 (1994); see
also Dirks v. SEC 463 U.S. 646, 666 (1983) (requiring knowledge of an omission and a duty to
disclose).
268
858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988). vacated on other grounds,492 U.S. 914 (1989).
M9
See id. at 1111-12. One fact allegedly omitted was that numerous investigations were being
conducted of the issuer for possible securities violations. See id.
270
See id. at 1128.
271
See id. at 1127.
272
See id. at 1128.
273 See id.
274

511 U.S. 164 (1994).

275

See id. at 177.

276

See In re Leslie Fay Cos., 871 F.Supp. 686, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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Securities Exchange Act, which allows the SEC (but not private parties) to
bring an action for aiding and abetting under section 10(b). 277
Section 20(0, however, requires that the secondary violator knowingly
give substantial assistance to primary violators.278 The extent of liability
under this knowing standard is uncertain because it has not yet been
interpreted by the courts. If the courts use the Rule lOb-5 standard of
knowing, then it would encompass reckless actions. 279 This interpretation
would potentially expose corporate counsel to even greater liability because
a cause of action could be brought even if he or she acted in good faith.
There has been an increasing trend in recent years of attempting to hold
corporate counsel liable under the securities laws for aiding and abetting
their clients. This attempted liability has not only resulted from knowingly
assisting a corporate client,280 but also for not saying something when there
might be a duty to do so. 281 Such strict liability is appropriate, howeverparticularly for in-house counsel-since they should be intimately familiar
with the corporation's activities and should know about any information
which might give rise to a violation of the securities laws. Thus, counsel
needs to be extremely vigilant to ensure proper disclosure under the strict
securities laws to avoid liability.

2. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY & ERISA
Corporate counsel can also be held liable under a new, emerging
standard for aiding and abetting corporate officers and directors in
breaching the fiduciary duties which they owe to the corporation. 282
Although the case did not involve a suit against an attorney, Q.E.R., Inc. v.
Hickerson283 is illustrative of the potential liabilities which counsel can
face for assisting another in breaching his or her fiduciary duties. In
Hickerson, the director of HEC assigned HEC's oil and gas leases to a

278

See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (1997).
See id.

279

See Ann Maxey, Competing Duties? Securities Lawyers' Liability After Central Bank, 64

277

FORDHAM L. REV. 2185, 2196 (1996).
280
See, e.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496 (4th Cir. 1991) (requiring a high level of
knowledge if the aider and abetter owed no duty to the injured).
281
See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding liability if the aider
and abetter merely knew about the alleged violations of the law). See generally McNulty & Hanson,
supra note 265 (discussing whether aiding and abetting liability can arise under the securities laws
because of a person's failure to disclose known information).
282
See, e.g.,Weingarten v. Warren, 753 F. Supp. 491, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that an
attorney could be held liable for aiding and abetting a trustee in breaching his fiduciary duty). See
generally, Pietrusiak, supra note 266 (discussing the emerging theory of an attorney being held liable
for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty).
283
880 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1989).
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partnership in which the company was involved with another corporation,
Q.E.R., to develop oil and gas prospects. Subsequently, the director of
HEC assigned the same leases to a company which threatened to sue HEC
for its failure to repay a debt. 284 Consequently, Q.E.R. sued the director of
HEC for aiding and abetting HEC's breach of fiduciary duty owed to
Q.E.R. as a general partner. 28 The court held that aiding and abetting the
breach of a fiduciary duty was a recognized tort and that sufficient facts
existed to find that the partner of HEC aided the company in breaching its
fiduciary duty owed to the partnership. 86
Considerable concern also exists that corporate counsel could be held
liable under ERISA as an aider and abetter if he or she knowingly assisted a
person who was the primary fiduciary of a pension plan's assets in
breaching the fiduciary duty that the person owed to the trust. 28 7 For
example, in Thornton v. Evans,28 attorneys for insurance companies were
charged with aiding and abetting for allegedly drafting documents which
assisted the principal in defrauding a pension plan out of $1.1 million when
those funds were channeled to the principal through companies that the
attorneys represented. 289 The court stated that nonfiduciaries have a
"duty... to refrain from conspiracy to facilitate actions by... fiduciaries
constituting fraud on the [plan] .290 Thus, the court held that counsel could
be liable for aiding and abetting the plan's trustee in breaching his fiduciary
duty, which occurred when counsel drafted documents that assisted in the
deceptive transfer of funds. 29'
3. CONSPIRACY
Akin to aiding and abetting liability, counsel can also be held liable for
conspiring with corporate officers and directors to commit a violation of
the law.
For example, in In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln
284

See id.at ll81.
See id.
286
See id. at 1183.
287
See Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987);
Christopher G. Sablich, Note, Duties of Attorneys Advising FinancialInstitutions in the Wake of the
S&L Crisis, 68 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 517, 540 (stating that "[t]he federal pension laws of ERISA give rise
to much of the federal case law regarding attorneys aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties").
28
692 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1986).
289
See id. at 1081-82.
29
Id. at 1082, n.42.
291
Id. at 1082-83.
292
See, e.g., Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 639 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (stating that "[c]onspiracy liability may properly be imposed on nonfiduciary agents or attorneys
for conduct which they carry out not simply as agents or employees of fiduciary defendants, but in
furtherance of their own financial gain").
285
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Savings and Loan Securities Litigation,293 a law firm conducted a precompliance audit for a savings and loan before a regulatory agency's
examination. 294 During this review, the law firm found several regulatory
violations-including backdated files, destroyed appraisals, and record
alterations-and advised the client how to rectify the deficiencies so that
the regulatory agency's auditors would not notice them.295 Consequently,
the Resolution Trust Corporation filed a RICO violation against the law
firm for aiding and abetting the thrift in deceiving federal regulators. The
court held (1) that sufficient evidence existed to find that the law firm
failed to provide clear and direct information to its client that its conduct
violated the law, and (2) that the law firm may even have assisted the thrift
in deceiving regulators.29
However, in Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield,2 97 the court
found that a corporation's attorney could not be liable for conspiracy to the
minority shareholder of a corporation because the attorney had no
individual duty 298 to the minority shareholder nor did he receive a personal

financial interest from the transaction. 299 In Skarbrevik, the corporation's
attorney perfected an amendment which diluted the minority shareholder's
interest, knowing that the minority shareholder had not been given notice of
the amendment and that no annual meeting had been held wherein the
amendment would have been voted upon. 300 Although the minority
shareholder asserted a conspiracy claim against the, corporate counsel, the
court held that the attorney could not be held liable because he "had no
personal duty to disclose the facts intentionally concealed. ' 0 '
Counsel, nonetheless, can be held liable for conspiracy under three
alternatives: (1) when the attorney acts not only as an agent of the
corporation, but also attempts to obtain a personal financial gain from the
actions; (2) counsel violates his or her own duty to the client when
conspiring with another; or (3) counsel violates an independent duty owed

293
294
295

794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992).

296

See id. at 1452.

See id. at 1450.
See id. (stating that the violations about which the firm allegedly had knowledge included
backdating of files, destruction and removal of records, and instructions not to issue written reports
when their representations were unfavorable).
M
298

282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
See supra notes 106-151 and accompanying text (discussing counsel's liability to third-party
shareholders).
299
See 282 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
3W
See id. at 637.
301
Id. at 639. This also would have been true if the attorney was representing the majority
shareholders instead of the corporation. See id.
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to an injured third party.3°2 Thus, whether counsel will be liable for
conspiracy will depend on the facts of each case. Although numerous cases
have been reported where corporate counsel have been -charged with
303
conspiracy, very few have actually held counsel liable.
E. EnvironmentalLaws
304
Under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
and the Comprehensive Environmental Regulatory Act (CERCLA),30 5
owners, operators, generators, and transporters of hazardous waste can be
held liable for violations of the environmental laws. 30 6 Theoretically, these
laws could encompass in-house counsel 3°7 since they provide advice to the
corporate client about whether its actions violate the environmental laws.
However, there has not been a plethora of suits filed against attorneys
alleging that they fall into one of those four categories and can incur
environmental liability.
One of the first and most widely-known cases filed against counsel for
alleged environmental law violations involved InFerGene Co., a biotechnology company in California which filed for bankruptcy in 1991.308 After
being evicted by its landlord, the company allegedly abandoned containers
containing radioactive waste and cultures of sexually transmitted diseases.
This alleged abandonment occurred because an associate at the corporation's law firm believed that removal of the materials would constitute a
pre-petition claim under the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the associate wrote to
the landlord stating that the company could not remove the waste.
The California District Attorney's office, however, filed felony charges
against, among others, the law firm and the associate who sent the letter to
the landlord. The basis for the charges was the belief that the letter
effectuated an abandonment of hazardous waste, which was a disposal,
thereby violating the environmental laws. Stating that the attorneys knew
or should have known that they were causing hazardous waste to be
302
See, e.g., Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court, 775 P.2d 508, 512 (Cal. 1989); see also Metts v.
Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 618 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
303
But see Dempsey v. Sternik, 498 N.E.2d 310 (111.App. Ct. 1986) (holding a corporate
attorney liable for conspiracy because he solicited the customers of one corporate client which he
represented for another corporate client); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964)
(holding that sufficient evidence existed to find a corporate attorney liable for conspiring with the
company's auditor during the registration of securities).
M4
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 1995).
3M
Id. §§ 9601-9675.
306
See also Buchwald, supra note 45, at S1.
3M
See 3 MALEN & SMrrH, supra note 2, § 22.14, at 32.
3W
See generally Michelle D. Jordan, Counsel's Duty to Disclose and Lability for
EnvironmentalRisks and Audits, 445 P.LIJLIrG. 857, 872-73 (1992).
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disposed, the prosecutor stated that the case stands for the proposition "that
attorneys advising clients to violate environmental laws will be
prosecuted." Although a municipal court judge twice dismissed the
charges against the law firm,3° the case provides an indication of the
potential liability which counsel may face for environmental crimes.
Research has revealed only one reported case, City of North Miami v.
Berger,31 that attempted to hold a corporation's counsel liable as an
"operator." In Berger, the city contracted with the operator of a landfill
which was declared a hazardous site under CERCLA. Consequently, the
city brought a claim against (among others) the corporation's counsel who
provided legal advice to the landfill, was the corporate secretary, and had a
15 percent investment interest in the corporation, claiming that he was an
"operator" under CERCLA.31 1 The court found that, although his legal
advice furthered the project's development, the corporation's counsel could
not be held liable as an "operator" because he did not have any ultimate
3 2
decision-making authority over the corporation's day-to-day operations. 1
However, without the minimal distinction that counsel had
no authority, the
313
attorney could likely have been held liable as an operator.
Since corporate counsel do not run the daily business affairs of the
corporation, holding them responsible for their advice regarding whether a
potential environmental problem exists would be inappropriate. The only
circumstance under which it might be appropriate to hold attorneys liable is
when their advice knowingly assists their client in committing or
continuing to cover up environmental contamination. 3 14 Given the dearth
of cases regarding environmental liability issues and clients' attorneys, it
nonetheless appears that counsel's incurrence of liability for the
environmental crimes committed by their corporate clients
will be minimal,
31 5
although a significant potential for liability does exist.
F. Intellectual PropertyLaws
Counsel can only be held directly liable under the intellectual property
laws if he or she infringes upon an already patented invention, copyright, or
309

See Marianne Lavelle, Judge Drops Charges Against S.F. Law Firm, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6,
1992, at 15.
310
828 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Va. 1993).
311
Seeid. at 411-12.
312

See id.

See 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 22.14, at 32.
This action may not only lead to liability under the environmental laws but would also lead
to malpractice liability since an attorney can not assist a client in engaging in conduct which the
attorney knows is criminal. See Model Rule 1.2(d).
315
See generally, J.B. Ruhl, Malpracticeand EnvironmentalLaw: Should Environmental Law
"Specialists" Be Worried?,33 HOUSTON L. REV. 173 (1996).
313

314
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trademark. 316 However, counsel have occasionally been subjected to
malpractice actions by their clients for negligence in their representation
regarding intellectual property matters. Until recently, there have been few
such actions, probably because corporate clients are frequently unable to
detect errors due to the technical nature of intellectual property work.317
All of the recent cases have found liability based on the negligent
handling of transactions relating to copyrights, patents, and trademarks.
Such liability arises from the same fiduciary obligations and ethical
responsibilities as other attorneys who do not specialize in the practice of
intellectual property law.31 8 For example, actions have been brought for
failing to perfect a patent, 31 9 failing to search for pending trademark
320
321
applications, failing to find an alreadyZ existing patent, failing to file a
patent within the applicable time limit, and failing to advise of liability
resulting from infringing on a patent.323 No cases have been found,
however, which have held an attorney directly liable for violating the
intellectual property laws.
G. Antitrust Laws
Antitrust liability under the Sherman Act 324 arises when a corporate
agent actively and knowingly assists the corporation in violating the
antitrust laws. 325 Thus, an attorney can be held liable under the antitrust
laws, but only if he or she actively participates in intentionally furthering
anticompetive goals.32
For example, the court in Brown v. Donco
Enterprises,Inc.,327 held that counsel was not liable for merely advising the
corporation on only legal and not policy matters.328
316
317

35 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West 1984).
See 3 MAUEN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 22.23, at 76.

318

See id.

319

See, e.g., Lex Tex Ltd., Inc. v. Skillman, 579 A.2d 244, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
See, e.g., Ameracount Club, Inc. v. Hill, 617 S.W.2d 876, 876 (Tenn. 1981).
See, e.g., Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Leydig, Voit & Mayer, 633 N.E.2d 627, 628 (Ill. 1994).
See, e.g., Boehm v. Wheeler, 223 N.W.2d 536, 537 (Wis. 1974), overruled on other

320
321
322

grounds, Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
323
See, e.g., In re SMEC, Inc., 160 B.R. 86, 88-89 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
324
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-37a (West 1997).
325
See Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1522 (9th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Donco Enter., Inc.,
783 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cit. 1986).
326
See Brown, 783 F.2d at 646.
327
783 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986).
329
See id. at 647; see also Amarel, 102 F.3d at 1523 (reinforcing that there must be proof that
corporate counsel exerted influence over the corporate agents to violate the antitrust laws); Spanish Int'l
Communications Corp., Sin v. Leibowitz, 608 F. Supp. 178, 180 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (stating that an
attorney could not be held liable when insufficient facts were plead to demonstrate that counsel had a
financial interest or was a principal in the antitrust violations), affd, 778 F.2d 791 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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Several courts have stated that corporate counsel could be held liable
under the Sherman Act if they "exert[] ... power and influence to direct
the corporation to engage in ... anticompetitive acts., 329 This means that
"an attorney is not immune from antitrust liability if he becomes an active
participant in formulating policy decisions with his client to restrain
competition. 330 Nonetheless, the prevailing view is that counsel can not be
subjected to antitrust liability for the advice which they provide to their
corporate clients.33' The Ninth Circuit best summarized the state of the law
in Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Ass'n v. Tillamook County Creamery
Ass'n:331
We do not believe [the general] rule can be applied to the
counsel for a corporation whose activity is brought into question, if
the role of the counsel was only that of a legal adviser [sic]. This
would be true even if, as counsel, he mistakenly advised corporate
officers that a particular course of conduct would not violate [the
antitrust laws]. But if he goes beyond that role and, acting by
himself or jointly with others, makes policy decisions for the
corporation, then he subjects himself to liability... as in the case
of any executive officer of the company performing a similar
function.333
Thus, given that there have not been many cases where liability has
even been asserted against corporate counsel and the inability to find any
cases which hold corporate counsel liable under the Sherman Act,
counsel's exposure to antitrust liability appears to be minimal.
H. Commercial Transactions
There is a vast spectrum over which counsel may potentially incur
malpractice liability for commercial transaction work. Some of the more
typical errors which have lead to liability include failing to record
documents necessary to protect the corporation's best interests,
329
330

783 F.2d at 646-47.
See, e.g., Pinhas v. Summit Health, lid., 894 F.2d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing
Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Ass'n v. Tillamook County Creamery Ass'n, 358 F.2d 115, 118 (9th Cir.
1966)), afftd, 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
331
See 3 MALL.N & SMITH, supra note 2, § 22.9, at 24.
332
358 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1966), af'd, 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
333

334

Id. at 118.

See, e.g., Hansen v. Anderson, 831 P.2d 717, 719 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (failing to perfect a
security interest); Peoples Nat'l Bank of Rockland County v. Weiner, 514 N.Y.S.2d 772, 775 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987) (liability imposed for failing to determine whether a UCC financing statement needed
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improperly 33preparing contracts,335 and failing to properly draft
agreements.
Although not all suits against counsel for alleged malpractice in
undertaking commercial transactions succeed, defending against such suits
involves considerable time and expense. Other claims which have been
made against counsel but have not succeeded include attempts to hold
attorneys liable for a corporation's unsuccessful venture,337 and the alleged
338
failure to provide proper advice about obtaining financing.
Thus,
corporate counsel must be continuously vigilant about the quality of their
work to avoid potential liability relating to commercial transactions.

I. Opinion Letters & Advice
In complex commercial litigation, the client often seeks an opinion (or
"comfort") letter prepared by counsel to provide advice about all of the
legal and technical consequences of a proposed transaction.339 Such letters
are often critical to closing a deal, particularly in securities transactions. 34 0
Therefore, counsel must be sure to exercise careful due diligence in
preparing opinion letters, especially since they reflect counsel's
professionalism and expertise. For instance, the ABA has issued an
opinion requiring that an attorney who issues a comfort letter about the sale
of unregistered securities undertake an inquiry if there are any suspect or
inconsistent facts provided to the attorney.
There have been increasing attempts to hold counsel liable for the good
faith advice which they provide to clients in the form of opinion letters. 42
to be filed which caused the corporation to lose its status as a secured creditor); Modica v. Crist, 276
P.2d 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (liability arising from the failure to record notice that a business was
being sold, thereby subjecting the seller to claims of the corporation's creditors).
335
See, e.g., Boyles v. Smith, 759 P.2d 518, 519-20 (Alaska 1988) (attempting to impose
liability on an attorney for creating a usurious contract).
336
See, e.g., Haenel v. November & November, 567 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (suit
for alleged malpractice resulting from the drafting of an invalid shareholder agreement which allowed
an officer-shareholder to commit waste, thereby reducing the corporation's stock price).
337
See, e.g., Vitale v. Coyne Realty, Inc., 414 N.Y.S.2d 388, 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
(holding an attorney not liable since his legal opinion was not sought regarding a business venture).
338
See, e.g., Yusefzadeh v. Ross, 932 F.2d 1262, 1265 (8th Cit. 1991) (holding an attorney not
liable since the corporation failed to prove that it could have obtained financing).
339
See Leslie L Gardner, Attorney Liability to Third Parties for Corporate Opinion Letters, 64
B.U. L REV. 415,419 (1984).
W
See Darrel A. Rice & Marc L Steinberg, Legal Opinions in Securities Transactions, 16 J.
CORP. L. 375, 375 (1991).
341
See A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974); see
also supra notes 200-214 and accompanying text (describing the extent of counsel's duty to investigate
facts).
342
See Joel Cohen & Norman Bloch, Can Lawyers be Prosecuted for the Advice They Give?,
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Opinion letters can be issued either to the client or, upon the client's
343
request, to a third party who is expected to rely on the opinion letter.
Opinion letters issued directly to the client usually will not result in
liability to corporate counsel. The rational for such a result is that, absent a
confidential or fiduciary relationship to a third party, there is no duty of
disclosure to the third party.4'3
The Model Rules specifically allow counsel to prepare a document for
a third party that evaluates a situation affecting the counsel's
corporation. 345 Because there is an expectation that the third party will rely
on the opinion, an increasing number of courts have held attorneys liable
for malpractice to a third party because of improper advice provided in
opinion letters when the attorney3 knew or should have known that a third
party would rely upon the letter. For example, in Montgomery County v.
Jaffe, Raitt, Heuer & Weiss, P.C.,347 the county sued a law firm for
misstatements contained in an opinion letter that the law firm sent to the
county on behalf of the law firm's client, a partnership which was working
on a project for the county. 348 The court held that the law firm could be
liable since the county was the349intended beneficiary of the agreement which
gave rise to the opinion letter.
350
Similarly, in Crossland Savings FSB v. Rockwood Insurance Co.,

counsel issued a legal opinion containing false representations to a
partnership which obtained financing in the form of promissory notes from
a bank which assigned the notes to another lender.
A surety company
guaranteed those notes. When the assignee for its guaranty sued the surety
of the uncollectible notes, the surety brought an action against the law firm,
claiming that the law firm should be held liable for the notes because of its
incorrect legal opinion. The law firm, however, moved for summary
N.Y. L.J., July 23, 1991, at 1.
343
See Gardner, supra note 339, at 419-20.
34
See, e.g., Rubin v. Schotterstein, Zox & Dunn, 110 F.3d 1247, 1256 (6th Cir. 1997); Schatz
v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 490 (4th Cir. 1991); Roberts v. Peat Marwich, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d
646, 653 (9th Cir. 1988).
345
See Model Rule 2.3. There is no analogous "evaluation" provision in the Model Code.
M6
See also supra Part II.B (discussing liability to nonclient, third parties). Cf. Washington
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 894 F. Supp. 777, 785-86 (D. Vt. 1995)
(holding that attorneys could not be liable to a nonclient third-party who relied on a legal opinion,
despite counsel's direct interaction with the third-party).
347
897 F. Supp. 233 (D. Md. 1995).
34
See id. at 235.
349
See id. at 237; see also Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Central Bank of Denver,
N.A., 892 P.2d 230, 237 (Colo. 1995) (holding that attorney could be liable to a nonclient for opinion
letters upon which the attorney knew that the nonclient would rely).
350
700 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
351

See id. at 1275.

44

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol.7:1

judgment, alleging that it could not be liable to the assignee since its client
352
was the bank and it did not even know about the assignment.
Nonetheless, the court denied the motion and held that the law firm could
be liable to the third party assignee,353 stating that "a lawyer [cannot] be
held liable in negligence only to those who pay her bills .... [especially]
[w]hen 3 the
lawyer represents that she is acting on the third party's
4
behalf.
Even if counsel is not held liable under a malpractice theory because
they lack privity with the third party, they can still be held liable under a
separate negligent misrepresentation tort theory. For example, in F.E.
Appling Interests v. McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler, 355 an attorney
representing a financial institution signed a settlement agreement attesting
that it complied with various statutory requirements before it could be
effective, including that it had been approved by the board. 356 The board
never approved the agreement, however, and the relying party brought suit
against the financial institution's attorney because the agreement could not
be enforced.35 7 The court found that a malpractice claim could not be
asserted by the third party because there was no privity, and an attorney in
Texas only owes a duty to his or her client.358 Nonetheless, the court held
that the attorney could be liable for negligent misrepresentation,
which is a
319
cause of action separate from a malpractice claim.
Privity is not required
for a negligent misrepresentation claim; liability can arise if the36attorney
was aware of the third party's reliance and intended such reliance. 0
Despite the above examples, counsel who err about an unsettled point
of law or theories about which similarly situated lawyers would have
reasonable doubts likely will not incur liability -for the resulting erroneous
advice which they provided. 61 Although most courts generally hold
counsel who regard themselves as a specialist in a particular area of the law
to a higher standard of care, 362 some courts also require that every attorney,
352
353

See id.
at 1283.

356
357

See id. at 406.
See id. at 407.

358
359

See id. (citing Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996)).
See id.
at 408.

360

See id.

See id.; accord Vereins-UND Westbank v. Carter, 691 F. Supp. 704, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that attorney could be liable to an assignee although its identity was not known when the
opinion letter was written).
354 700 F. Supp. at 1282.
355
953 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).

See, e.g., Martinson Mfg. Co. v. Seery, 351 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1984) (attorney not liable for
misinterpreting an IRS provision since well-informed lawyers could disagree about the provision's
correct interpretation).
362
See, e.g., Transcraft, Inc. v. Galvin, Stalmack, Kirschner & Clark, 39 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir.
361
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whether or not a specialist, should be knowledgeable about certain
substantive and procedural aspects of various fields of the law. 363 Thus, if
counsel renders incorrect advice about a fundamental area of the law, then
they may be held liable for malpractice. Moreover, in giving advice,
counsel also has the duty "to discover those additional rules of law which,
although not commonly known, may readily be found by standard research
techniques.,, 364 Although these amorphous concepts do not provide much
guidance to counsel, they do suggest the potential malpractice liability to
which counsel may be subjected if they fail to use adequate care in
rendering legal advice.
IV. MINIMIZING AND AVOIDING POTENTIAL LIABILITY

It is a challenge to balance the traditional roles of a lawyer as a
counselor and advocate with the newer roles of investigator,
informer, and sometimes prosecutor. But I submit that it is a
challenge that corporate counsel must meet appropriately in order
to successfully
carry out his or her professional responsibility to
5
the entity.

36

Despite the many liabilities faced by in-house counsel, there are ways
to minimize and even avoid incurring liability. Of course, the easiest way
would be to say or do nothing, but that is not feasible. Instead, to minimize
the potential of incurring liability, at least three steps can be taken: (1)
clearly identify what type of client relationship exists, if any; (2) when
providing advice, attempt to distinguish between legal and business advice;
and (3) create centralized in-house legal departments. Even if every
precaution is taken to avoid incurring liability, lawsuits--even if not
meritorious-are still likely to be brought against in-house counsel. Thus,
counsel should also ensure that they are covered under their corporation's
indemnification and insurance policies.
A. Attorney-Client Relationship

1994); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. CEI Fla.,
Inc., 864 F. Supp. 656, 673 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
363
See, e.g., Bucquet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514, 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that
any attorney doing estate planning should know certain tax laws).
364
Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975), overruled on other grounds, In re Marriage of
Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976).
365
H.J. Aibel, Corporate Counsel and Business Ethics: A Personal Review, 59 MO. L. REV.
427, 439 (1994).
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As discussed in Part H, many claims arise because a constituent of the
corporation believes that the corporate counsel represents him or her
personally. For example, many corporate executives do not realize that
366
corporate counsel represents only the corporation, not them individually.
There are several steps that counsel can take to clarify their role in the
corporation.
First, counsel must undertake the responsibility to ensure that the thirdparty constituent understands to whom counsel's loyalty belongs and the
repercussions resulting from a misunderstanding about whether an
attorney-client relationship has been created. Therefore, according to
Model Rule 1.13(d), counsel has the responsibility of identifying to a
nonentity constituent that he represents the corporation. 367 Similarly, the
Model Code requires that counsel explain the different interests involved,
the advantages of seeking independent legal
advice, and the advantages and
365
disadvantages to the nonentity client.
Although the Rules and Code
provide the attorney discretion about when they should give such a
warning, 369 to reduce the potential of liability being imposed by a
constituent, counsel is best advised always to provide such a warning if
there is even the slightest possibility that a conflict could develop.370
Second, a corporation's general counsel must be proactive and ensure
that the corporation has a "formal conflict of interest policy that covers all
management and other decision-making personnel." 371 One step that
should be taken is to alert others in the corporation that the in-house
counsel represents the corporation and not its constituents. This could be
accomplished by including a section in employee handbooks which clearly
states that the corporation's attorneys represent the corporation and not its
individual 37employees.
This is sometimes referred to as a "corporate
2
Miranda.
A third action that would be helpful in clarifying the corporate
counsel's role is to create an ethics committee to which both counsel and
nonlawyers could turn for guidance. This would not only help avert
366

See Sally R. Weaver, EthicalDilemmas ofCorporate Counsel: A Structural and Contextual

Analysis, 46 EMORY L.J. 1023, 1028 (1997).
367

See Model Rule 1.13(d).

368

See In re James, 452 A.2d 163, 176 (D.C. 1982) (describing Model Code DR 4-101(B) and

DR 5-104(A)).

369
370

See Model Rule 1.13 cmt.
See Hardin & Lee, supra note 3, at 37; see also E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp.
371, 400 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (stating that counsel has the responsibility to inform his clients of potential
conflicts of interest resulting from dual representation).
371
Conflicts of Interest: The General Counsel and Related-Party Transactions, BNA CORP.
COUNS. DALY, Aug. 1, 1996, at D6.
372
Tkacz, supranote 103, at 1.705.
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conflicts but also would remind management and employees that counsel's
373
loyalty is to the corporation, not to the individual employees or officers.
Finally, counsel should periodically reinforce the notion that his or her
responsibility is to the corporation, not its individual constituents. For
example, counsel could regularly remind the board of directors or
management374at meetings that his or her primary responsibility is to the
corporation.
Nonetheless, in the case where dual representation of both the
corporation and a corporate constituent may arise, providing a warning is
not necessary if counsel reasonably believes that the constituent understands to whom counsel's duty is owed.375 However, in most circumstances, it is advisable to provide cautionary notice to the constituent and to
take the following steps:
"Tell the [constituent] the reason for the meeting.
• Explain that, as the corporate attorney, he or she is representing the company.
* Explain that he or she may also represent the [constituent] in
the matter if the [constituent] consents and if there is no
conflict.
* Explain the details of the attorney-client privilege-that the
privilege belongs to the company, and the company can
subsequently waive it.
376
•Dictate and file a memo memorializing the conversation.
Although following the above steps may not avoid a future conflict, it
would at least limit counsel's liability exposure.
B. Advice
The success of corporate lawyers depends on the relationship that they
develop with the corporation's executives and on their ability "to make
professional contributions to the management's achievement of its business
373
374

See Daly, supranote 1, at 1.307-1.308.
See Weaver, supra note 366, at 1034.

375

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 163 cmt. 3 (Tentative

Draft No. 8, 1997). Issuing no warning may even be in the best interests of the corporation to ensure
full disclosure of the information. See id.
376
C. Evan Stewart, ForIn-House Counsel, Serving Two Masters Raises Ethical Issues: What
are the Constraintson Multiple Representation?,NAT'L L J., Aug. 30, 1993, at S19.
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goals. 377 Making this contribution often means that counsel must provide
more than pure legal advice. Because of the inherent problems that exist
when in-house counsel becomes too close to management, 378 they must
ensure that they maintain their independence and objectivity. 379 However,
this may be nearly impossible, as found by the court in In re Oracle
Securities Litigation.3 8 In Oracle, the general counsel allegedly represented only the corporation in a derivative lawsuit against the corporation's
inside directors.' 81 The court stated, however, that "in-house attorneys are
inevitably subservient to the interests of the [inside] directors and officers
whom they serve . . .particularly where corporate counsel advocates a
settlement that is highly favorable to the individual defendants who are his
0,82
superiors.
Maintaining one's independence may be particularly difficult if counsel
is also a director of the corporation.38 3 Although the corporation may feel
that counsel's "advice and vote will be more calculated to protect the
company and advance its goals" if he or she also becomes a director, 384 it
actually reduces counsel's independence, which may result in future legal
problems. Therefore, the "challenge is to render advice based upon both
business considerations and legal theory, keeping in mind [the] role as a
lawyer, and having objectivity as the main goal. 3 5 However, with the
dual loyalties both to the corporation through counsel's fiduciary duty and
the accountability to one's superior as an employee, this independence is
nearly impossible for in-house counsel to achieve. 386 Regardless, the
Model Rules and Code
require that counsel "exercise independent
38 7
professional judgment."
In such situations where there may be an appearance that counsel lacks
independence, counsel would be best advised to seek an opinion from
outside counsel. Such situations may arise, for example, where a
shareholder brings a derivative lawsuit against one of the corporation's
377
378
379

Aibel, supranote 365, at 428.
See Hardin & Lee, supra note 3, at 38.
See generally, Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988)
(discussing the independence of lawyers).
380
829 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
381 See id. at 1188.
382
Id. at 1188-89. Accord General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 498 (Cal.
1994) (noting "the distinguishing feature of the in-house attorney is a virtually complete dependence on

the good will and confidence of a single employer to provide livelihood and a career success").
383
See Cummins & Kelly, supranote 152, at 50; see also supra Part I.C (discussing attorneydirector conflicts).
384 See Cummins & Kelly, supra note 152, at 50.
385
Hardin & Lee, supra note 3, at 38.
386

See Metzloff, supra note 34, at 114.

387

Model Rule 2.1; see also Model Code Cannon 5.
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officers for breaching a duty of loyalty to the corporation. If counsel has a
close working relationship with the officer, then he or she likely may be
perceived as lacking the independence necessary to pursue the matter.
Consequently, to avoid the personal liability which may result from
counsel's own breach of fiduciary duty in failing to adequately represent
the corporation, counsel may want to seek an independent opinion from
outside counsel.
In addition, corporate counsel must be acutely aware of which hat they
wear when providing advice: the business hat or the legal hat. 388 One of
the best ways to do this is to clarify beforehand whether they are being
asked to provide business or lefal advice. The problem is that such advice
cannot be easily distinguished.
One attempt to explain what constitutes
legal advice is that which relates "to facts communicated for the purpose of
securing a 39legal
opinion, legal services or assistance in a legal
°
proceeding."
Historically, courts have used a case-by-case approach to determine if
the advice provided by counsel was legal or business in nature 3 9' with
protection being afforded only to legal advice. Recently, courts have
become more polarized in determining whether advice is legal or business
in nature. For example, in Georgia Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing
Manufacturing Corp.,392 the court held that an in-house attorney who
conducted negotiations for the corporation was performing a business
function instead of a legal function, despite the fact that such an activity
is one of the primary functions of a corporate attorney. The prevailing
view, however, is that expressed in Kelly v. Ford Motor Co.,394 where the
Third Circuit held that corporate counsel's legal advice to the board of
directors is protected by the attorney-client privilege although the advice
was used as the basis for a business decision. 395 Usually, if more legal
388

See Craig, supra note 8, at 1.205; see generally, Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice

Requirements of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside
Attorneys Representing Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1169, 1190-1217 (1997).
389
See Shira A. Scheindlin, Legal/Business Advice Dichotomy, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1993, at 7.
One court stated: "Although the rule is clearly stated, its application is difficult, since in the corporate
community, legal advice 'is often intimately intertwined with and difficult to distinguish from business
advice."' Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 98-99 (D.N.J. 1990) (quoting Sedco Int'l, S.A. v.
Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir. 1982)).
390
United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc. 874 F.2d 20, 27-28 (1st
Cir. 1989).
391
See generally Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372 (N.D.
Cal. 1992).
392
No. Civ. 93-5125, 1996 WL 29392 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996).
393

See id. at *4.

394
395

110 F.3d 954 (3d Cir. 1997).
See id. at 966.
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advice is provided-even if it contains substantial nonlegal aspects-then
the standard usually would be met, and the advice would be protected.396
Nonetheless, to limit potential liability which may result from losing
the attorney-client privilege, any advice should begin with introductory
phrases that clearly indicate whether the advice being provided is legal or
business in nature. Furthermore, it would also be helpful to "clearly
identify legal theories and conclusions and distinguish them from general
business advice" in communications where legal and business advice are
intermixed.397 For example, in written matters, counsel should always use
letterhead and stationary that clearly states his or her legal capacity. 39 This
allows both counsel and the receiver of the advice to know the extent to
which they can rely upon the information. Clearly distinguishing between
legal and business advice is essential, especially when counsel
attempts to
3 99
recover from his or her insurance carrier if liability arises.
Finally, another important requirement is that counsel should always
deliver advice to the appropriate person. This person is the one who has
the ultimate authority to execute on the decision. 4° A direct channel of
communication is much more beneficial than going through an
intermediary since an intermediary may have a stake in the transaction. 4°1
For example, a subordinate may have an ulterior motive in making a
favorable recommendation to his superior if landing a big contract provides
-a personal benefit because a profit-sharing distribution will consequently
be greater. Counsel should also ensure that the person who receives the
advice understands that the advice could be incorrect. This could occur, for
instance, if the advice was based on 4 improperly
communicated facts,
2
0
judgments.
incorrect
in
resulting
thereby
C. Legal Departments
Creating separate legal departments in each corporate business unit
may allow attorneys to become more familiar with the business side of
potential problems.4 3 However, it also increases the likelihood that courts
396
397
398
399

See Flucke, supra note 187, at 558.
Id. at 578.
See id. at 577.
See infra notes 422-34 and accompanying text (discussing the problem which counsel face
in recovering from their insurance company when there is uncertainty over whether the advice was legal
or business in nature).
400
See Cecil D. Quillen, The Professional Responsibilities of In-House Lawyers, in
CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO LAWERYING LAWS 1.101, 1.103 (Business Laws, Inc. ed., 1996).
401
See id.
402
See id.

403
See Bencivenga, In-House Counsel, supra note 157, at 5; accord, What's the Return on
Your Investment? These Legal Departments are Proving Themselves to Clients, Demanding More
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will not look at advice provided by such attorneys as legal in nature
because of the perceived increase in coziness that the attorney has with
management in the smaller business unit.404 Thus, the risk increases that
the attorney-client privilege will be waived and that the number of conflicts
of .interest may rise, both of which could increase counsel's exposure to
potential malpractice liability.
Limiting liability by funneling all of the legal decisions through one
corporate law department would be more advantageous. 40 5 This assists in
ensuring the independence of counsel and that the advice is objective since
it would decrease the likelihood that a manager of a particular corporate
division would dominate counsel. 4 M In addition, for attorneys who are
specialists (particularly in large legal departments), they could occasionally
be reassigned to other specialities to avoid "attachment" to a particular
department or set of management employees. 40 7 This would help to ensure
that they do not become "well-nigh clones" of the department's
management or develop tunnel vision which prevents them from identifying
problems outside their area of specialization.
Corporations also "must recognize and be sensitive to the fact that inhouse counsel are pulled in many directions."'4 Thus, to protect in-house
counsel against suits by nonclients, corporations should create internal
guidelines for their in-house counsel.. (who
are employees) and clearly
410
define their role within the corporation.
For example, if a corporation
defined the specific fiduciary duties of corporate counsel, then counsel
411
could develop defenses against a breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit.
Another example is aiding and abetting liability discussed in Part llI.D. To
provide a defense against aiding and abetting claims, corporations could
write specific job descriptions for in-house counsel, which would allow
them to assert a defense if they have never seen, and had no responsibility
to see, a particular document which allegedly should have provided counsel
with notice of a legal violation. 2
from Others, CORP. L. TIMES, Apr. 1997, at 34 [hereinafter What's the Return] (stating how the law
firm then becomes an integral part of the business).
4N4
See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
4W
See Sam A. Snyder, Special Liability for In-House Counsel, 515 PRAC. L. INSTJCORP. 377,
381 (1986).
40
See id. at 381; accord What's the Return, supra note 403, at 34 (stating how tensions are
created when counsel has to report to the head of a corporate division).
4M
See Snyder, supra note 405, at 382.
4
See id.
409
Staffenberg, supra note 14, at 423.
410

See id.

411
412

See id.; see also supra Part Ill.A.
See Staffenberg, supra note 14, at 423.
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Finally, an area of the law where counsel could potentially be exposed
to a malpractice action is in failing to "ensure that the [law department] has
in effect measures giving reasonable assurances that all lawyers in the [law
department] conform to the rules of professional conduct. 413 Particularly,
general counsel could be exposed to liability for work done by those over
which he or she has supervisory authority, which would presumably be
all of the attorneys in the law department. Nonetheless, for general counsel
to be liable for malpractice resulting from other attorney's violations of the
415
Model Rules, counsel must have ordered or approved the conduct, or
having known about the conduct, failed to take action which could have
avoided or mitigated the resulting consequences. 416 This supervisory
to nonlawyers such as secretaries, paralegals, law
liability rule also applies
S . 417
clerks, and investigators.
D. Indemnification
No matter how many precautions corporate attorneys take to protect
against liability, the risk of a lawsuit and resulting liability always remains.
Furthermore, although some examples previously described in this article
may not have found counsel liable, there is still a significant cost involved
in defending against such lawsuits. Thus, counsel must ensure that they are
protected against having to pay personally for defending against such
claims, which is the purpose of indemnification agreements. However, inhouse counsel must look at each individual state's corporate statute to
determine whether they are even entitled to indemnification. Some state
statutes are permissive and do not automatically require that the
corporation provide indemnification.4 8
Even if a corporate charter contains provisions that provide
indemnification for directors and officers, such language may be too broad
to protect in-house counsel fully.419 Thus, it would be advantageous to
have "an express indemnification agreement which defines the actions
413
Model Rule 5.1(a); see also Model Rule 5.1 cmt. (expressly stating that Rule 5.1 applies to
legal departments in an organization).
See Model Rule 5.1 (b).
414
415
See Model Rule 5.1(c)(1).
416
See Model Rule 5.1(c)(2).
417
See Model Rule 5.3.
418
See e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West 1990) (permitting indemnification); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (West 1992) (permitting indemnification). Cf MINN. STAT. ANN. §
302A.521 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (requiring indemnification if acted in official capacity); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-8-56 (1996) (requiring indemnification for officers unless otherwise provided in the
articles of incorporation).
419
See Honig, supra note 7, at 8.207.
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indemnified, the procedures for indemnification (and defense), and
420 the
availability of indemnification following termination of employment.,
E. Insurance
In-house attorneys, as individuals, do not have deep pockets from
which to defend against or settle claims brought against them. Thus, inhouse counsel must rely on insurance to help them defend against
individual liability lawsuits. 42 ' The problem is that legal malpractice
insurance policies only protect against acts, errors, and omissions done
while performing professional services in one's capacity as a lawyer.422 For
example, the Attorney's Liability Assurance Society (ALAS), who
underwrites many legal malpractice insurance policies, specifically
excludes from coverage any claims of malpractice if, at the time of the
conduct complained of, a member of the law firm representing the
corporate client held any type of officer position in the corporation.423
Under this "business pursuits" exclusion, professional liability policies do
not cover actions taken as a corporate officer or director. 424 Since the line
425
between legal and business advice is not always clear, the attorney might
be without sufficient insurance coverage.
Corporate counsel may also be covered as an officer under a
corporation's directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance policy.
However, such policies frequently do not cover actions which counsel
undertake in their legal capacity.4 2 Furthermore, many claims made
against corporate attorneys are based on fraud; 427 yet, most D&O policies
exclude coverage for fraud. Even if counsel is covered by two policies (a
legal malpractice policy and a D&O policy), each insurance carrier
oftentimes argues that the other policy covers the liability. 429 This often
Id. at 8.207-8.208.
Of course, as one commentator suggested: "When third parties are suing, they're often
looking for deep pockets. By buying malpractice insurance, the lawyer may be setting himself or
herself up." Fisk, supra note 5, at 23.
422
See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 33.24, at 350.
420

421

423

See ATFORNEY'S LIABILfY ASSURANCE SOCIETY, LOSS PREVENTION MANUAL, Tab lIE at 8.

See id.
See supra notes 388-99 and accompanying text (discussing the problem with distinguishing
between legal and business advice).
426
See Honig, supra note 7, at 8.209; see, e.g., Adamo v. State Farm Lloyds Co., 853 S.W.2d
673 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that a D&O carrier did not have to defend a claim which concerned a
breach of fiduciary duty based on a legal relationship).
427
See Anderson & Gold, supra note 5, at C27.
428
See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Brow, 787 F. Supp. 1424, 1429 (S.D.
Fla. 1991), aff'd, 963 F.2d 385 (11th Cir. 1992).
429
See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 514 N.W.2d
424

425
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results from "other insurance" clauses that are often included in policies.
coverage under a policy if the liability is covered
These clauses preclude
430
under another policy.
Therefore, attorneys are often in a catch-22: if they only get one
policy, then they may be denied coverage because that policy does not
cover the particular type of claim, and if they have two policies, then there
may be an extensive battle between the insurance companies about who
will be liable. Consequently, when an action is brought against counsel, he
or she may be forced to bring another suit against both of his insurance
carriers to determine which of his two hats-lawyer or business advisorhe was wearing at the time when he rendered the advice. 4 3 1 For example, in
Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Pepicelli, Pepicelli, Watts and Youngs,
P.C.,432 a corporation brought a malpractice suit against its counsel who
was an officer of another corporation involved in the suit. Subsequently,
the attorney sued its malpractice insurer for failing to defend him in the
action. The insurance carrier alleged that it had no- duty
433 to defend the
However, the
attorney since the policy excluded coverage for officers.
to
defend
against the
an
obligation
carrier
had
court held that the insurance
suit because the malpractice claim did not arise out of counsel's activities
as an officer of the other corporation.43 4 Although counsel in this case was
victorious, it still demonstrates the additional time and expense which
counsel can incur in attempting to recover under an insurance policy.
Although professional insurance for counsel is very rare,
corporations should provide all counsel with insurance sufficient to cover
all actions that may arise during representation of the corporation.
However, because of the potential for being denied coverage, corporate
counsel must thoroughly investigate the extent of their coverage before a
claim is made and determine what types of activities are considered the
practice of law and which are business activities. Even more advantageous
113, 121 (Mich. 1994) (holding that "other insurance" clauses in attorney's multiple liability insurance
policies were not irreconcilable).
430
See Anderson & Gold, supra note 5, at c. 27 n.16; see, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Executive Ins. Co., 893 F.2d 517, 520 (2d Cir. 1990) (providing an example of "other
insurance" policies).
431
See Cummins & Kelly, supra note 152, at 51; see also Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v. Greenbaum, 127
F.3d 15, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that a claim asserted against attorneys was not covered under
their malpractice insurance because their liability arose from business acts which were specifically
excluded in the policy).
432
821 F.2d 216 (3d Cir. 1987).
433
See id. at 220.
434
See id.
435
See Honig, supra note 7, at 8.209 (stating that "professional liability insurance for counsel is
the exception, not the rule").
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would be to receive examples from the insurance carrier of each type of
activity which would and would not be covered under the policy. Furthermore, to prevent disputes about whether the professional malpractice or a
D&O policy applies, counsel should try to obtain both policies from the
436
This would help to prevent overlap in
same insurance company.
coverage, eliminate costly disputes about which policy applies, and
possibly lower the total premiums paid because of the ability to pay a
composite premium.
V. CONCLUSION

Fortunately for in-house counsel, there have not been a plethora of
liability actions brought specifically against them.437 However, with the
increasing number of in-house counsel who "have become an integral part
of the management structure,, 438 the potential for liability has also
increased. In addition, with the number of in-house counsel increasing, it is
likely that the number of actions brought against them will likewise
increase. Thus, counsel need to be aware of the areas in which potential
liability may arise and take the necessary steps to ensure that they are
protected when it does arise. Although counsel can minimize or even avoid
some of the risks, it might not be advantageous to completely eliminate all
risks. As one corporate counsel has stated, "A risk-free society would be
less than productive and would doubtlessly be a boring and unhappy
place. 43 9

436
437
438
439

See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 33.28, at 361.
See Honig, supra note 7, at 8.210.
Aibel, supra note 365, at 427.
Snyder, supra note 405, at 387.

